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IDEOLOGICAL VOTING ON THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ronald Turner*
[National Labor Relations Board Chairman Guy] Farmer
acknowledged that the Board was a "political animal" and had
been "since its inception." It was not that someone in the White
House would tell a Board how to decide specific cases, Farmer
said, but a member appointed to the Board felt pressure to
implement the '"philosophy that he thought his administration
wanted him to project on the Board. "'
The Board pretends to act like a court solemnly arriving at the
correct interpretation of a legislative command, but in fact acts
like politicians carrying out their electoral mandate to favor
labor or to favor management.
2
There is nothing wrong with the [National Labor Relations] Act.
It just needs another President and a different kind of Board.3
I. INTRODUCTION
The quotations in the epigraph to this Article are representative of the
view, held by many, that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
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1. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS
POLICY, 1947-1994, at 97 (1995) (footnote omitted) (quoting former National Labor
Relations Board Chairman Guy Farmer).
2. Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Cases, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 163, 179 (2002).
3. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on
Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 285, 347 (1987) (quoting Leon Keyserling).
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Board) is, or can be, an administrative agency comprised of partial, if not
partisan, members carrying out the mandates, and protecting the interests,
of management or organized labor. Commenting on the Board's partiality,
Professor Clyde Summers has remarked:
The critical issues before the Board represent underlying disputes
between unions and management. No matter how the Board
decides these issues, it can not avoid aiding one and hindering the
other. Impartiality is impossible. There can be no impartial rules
governing the relationship between a tree and the woodsman's
4ax, even though we let the chips fall where they may.
Another analyst, Professor Joan Flynn, has asked whether "Board
members who come from the management or union side [are] more one-
sided in their decision-making than their colleagues from government or
other 'impartial' backgrounds?"5 In her view, "there seems little doubt that
management and union representatives appointed to the Board are likely to
be highly predisposed to the management or union-side point of view.",
6
Moreover, Flynn writes, a number of academics in the field of labor law
"adhere to a fairly predictable line-more often than not pro-union."7 And
Professor James Gross has argued that "a presidential administration can
make or change labor policy without legislative action through
appointments to the NLRB,"8 and that "national labor policy is in a
shambles in part because its meaning seems to depend primarily on which
political party won the last election."9 Studies have "found strong evidence
that [Board] members were influenced by their own ideological preferences
and those of appointing Presidents towards unions and employers (as
measured by the political party affiliation of members and Presidents)."'
Are these scholars correct that ideology and politics play a role in
NLRB decisionmaking? My impressionistic thesis and provisional
conclusion-based on service as a labor-management relations examiner
4. Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv.
93, 97 (1954).
5. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the
NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1398 (2000).
6. Id. at 1403.
7. Id.
8. GROSS, supra note 1, at 275.
9. Id.
10. William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of NLRB Decision-Making Revisited, 48
INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 237, 241 (1995); see also William N. Cooke & Frederick H.
Gautschi III, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INus. & LAB.
REL. REv. 539, 549 (1982) (arguing that common perceptions of political bias in NLRB
decisions are accurate); Charles D. Delorme, Jr. et al., The Determinants of Voting by the
National Labor Relations Board on Unfair Labor Practice Cases: 1955-75, 37 PuB.
CHOICE 207, 217 (1981) (noting "some of the most important political and economic
variables that effect the behavior of... the NLRB").
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with the Board, years of practice as a labor and employment lawyer, and
research as an academic lawyer-was that, at least in certain areas of
NLRB law and policy, the ideology" of a Board member can serve as a
predictive indicator of that member's vote. 12 Thus, one could predict, with
great confidence, that in some cases members who represented
management prior to their appointment to the Board would vote for and in
favor of management concerns and interests; likewise, votes for legal rules
and policies favoring organized labor could be anticipated and expected
from NLRB members with union-side backgrounds. 3
An opposing view, positing that NLRB decisionmaking is not
influenced or affected by politics or member ideology, has its adherents.
Current NLRB chair Robert Battista recently remarked, "[i]f you are asking
whether the board has gotten a political bias or an ideological bias, I'd say
no. 14 The notion that the NLRB is politicized has also been questioned by
Professor Paul Secunda in his recent study of Board decisions
"implementing the highly indeterminate inherently-destructive-conduct
standard."' 5 Finding "little correlation between the political composition of
the Board . . . and the frequency of inherently-destructive-conduct
determinations,' 6  Secunda argues that the NLRB's "institutional
collegiality' 17 "helps maintain the impartiality of the Board"' 8 and "permits
11. On the definition of ideology for purposes of this Article, see infra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text. For an analysis of various definitions and meanings of ideology, see
John Gerring, Ideology: A DefinitionalAnalysis, 50 POL. REs. Q. 957, 958-59 (1997).
12. For one account of the Board's ideological divide, written by a former NLRB chair,
see WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB-A
MEMOIR 256, 291-92 (2000).
13. One scholar has concluded that a "change in presidential administration from
Republican to Democrat gives rise to a pro-labor shift in NLRB performance, and a change
from Democrat to Republican produces a pro-business shift." Terry M. Moe, Control and
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1094,
1102 (1985); see also GROSS, supra note 1, at 275 (lamenting the instability of the Board as
administrations change).
14. Jane M. Von Bergen, NLRB: Helper or Nemesis?, Apr. 27, 2005,
http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/business/ 1500686.htm (quoting Battista).
15. Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not as Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct,
Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
51, 52-53 (2004). Certain employer conduct violates the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act) when that activity "is so inherently destructive of employee interests that it
may be deemed proscribed without need for proof of an underlying improper motive."
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965) ("[W]hen an employer
practice is inherently destructive of employee rights and is not justified by the service of
important business ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is
necessary to establish a violation .... ").
16. Secunda, supra note 15, at 95.
17. Id. at 103. Secunda notes that his concept of institutional collegiality is derived
from Judge Harry Edwards' articles discussing collegiality and judicial decisionmaking.
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Board members from all ideological perspectives to decide cases solely on
their legal merits and with the sole goal of getting the law right."19 For
Secunda, the "counterintuitive result"2° of his study provides "reason to
believe that if collegiality assists the Board in obtaining a good amount of
decisional consistency in this area of labor law, those same collegial
impulses should animate Board decisionmaking in other areas as well.'
While he is aware of the Board's "constant policy flip-flops over the
years," Secunda calls for "further empirical studies of other seemingly
malleable legal standards," which may "concretely establish that Board
Members and other agency adjudicators are engaging in collegial
See id. at 53 & n.6.
Noting that collegiality does not mean and is not the same as friendship, Judge Edwards
refers to "a common interest" judges share "in getting the law right," with judges "willing to
listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect." Harry T.
Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639,
1645 (2003). Edwards also believes "that collegiality plays an important part in mitigating
the role of partisan politics and personal ideology" as judges "communicate with, listen to,
and ultimately influence one another in constructive and law-abiding ways." Id.; see also
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV.
1335, 1358 (1998) [hereinafter Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making] (discussing the
benefits of the collegial deliberative process).
While Judge Edwards' conception of judicial collegiality and Professor Secunda's
reliance thereon are beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that Edwards has
recognized that in a "very hard" category of five to fifteen percent of all cases considered by
his court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, "it is more
likely (although not inevitable) that decisionmaking may be influenced by political or
ideological considerations." Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal
of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 837, 857 [hereinafter Edwards, The
Judicial Function]; see also id. at 854 (noting that in "very hard" cases with "no discernible
'right answer[s,]' it may be true that a judge's views are influenced by his or her political or
ideological beliefs"); cf Peter Ingram, Maintaining the Rule of Law, 35 PHIL. Q. 359, 376-
77 (1985) ("True hard cases.., are settled in the end according to extra-legal criteria, which
in our own day are usually those of politics, morality, or economics."). Furthermore, and of
particular relevance to this Article's topic, Judge Edwards has noted that "[p]olitical turmoil
and revision are nothing new to the NLRB, for the Board historically has responded to, and
reflected the philosophies of, the administrations that have appointed its members." Harry
T. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way
Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 24 (1985); see also Epilepsy
Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting, in Judge
Edwards' opinion for the court, that Board constructions of certain NLRA provisions
"invariably fluctuate with the changing compositions of the Board").
18. Secunda, supra note 15, at 103.
19. Id. at 105; see also id. at 103 (arguing that "the Members of the NLRB are able to
separate their political and institutional roles and do what is best for national labor policy").
20. Id. at 53; see also id at 102-03 (arguing that the outcome of the study "is clearly
counterintuitive" as the "highly indeterminate nature of the inherently-destructive-conduct
standard . ..would appear to permit political bias to infect the decisions made by
decisionmakers ensconced in a politically charged agency environment").





Heeding this call for additional research and inquiry, this Article
considers the role that ideology has played in NLRB decisionmaking. The
"ideology" discussed herein is not and should not be viewed as a pejorative
term or in a negative light. Rather, as used herein ideology-generally
"understood as normative commitments of various sorts" 23 -more
specifically refers to (1) the political party of the President appointing the
Board member, (2) the Board member's political party affiliation, and (3)
the professional background of the member prior to his or her appointment
to the NLRB.24 This Article concludes that the ideology of Board
members, so understood, is an important jurisprudential element in a
number of areas of NLRB-declared law and policy.25 Note that I do not
claim, and should not be understood as saying, that ideology always has an
outcome-influential or outcome-determinative impact in the agency's work.
As "more than ninety percent of the NLRB's decisions are unanimous,
' 26
any such claim would constitute gross overreaching. The only claim made
in this Article is that ideology has been a persistent and, in many instances,
a vote-predictive factor when the Board decides certain legal issues.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II provides an overview of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act),27 the NLRB, and
presidential appointments to the agency. Part III, highlighting the Board's
policy oscillations28 and discussing examples of ideological voting on the
NLRB, attempts to qualitatively demonstrate the ways in which Board
members have cast ideological votes in divisive cases presenting
22. Id.
23. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 352 (2004).
24. See infra Part III and the Appendix to this Article. In viewing ideology in this way,
I am indebted to the excellent work and analysis of Professor Joan Flynn. See generally
Flynn, supra note 5 (explaining this conception of ideology).
25. As my findings are in accord with my aforementioned impressionistic hypothesis
and provisional conclusion, I have kept in mind Judge Harry Edwards' observation that a
"researcher who assumes the existence of ideological bias or strategic behavior may 'find'
that these exist, while a researcher who considers alternative explanations may find that
what exists is rather different." Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making, supra note 17,
at 1338. I have tried, to the best of my ability, to avoid this researcher-bias problem.
26. Ross Runkel, NLRB Reversals During the Bush Administration, LAWMEMO, Jan.
19, 2006, http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/nlrbreversals.htm.
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
28. See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 171 (1985) (discussing "abrupt changes in policy
appearing to rework in wholesale major areas of Board law, often undone three or four years
later"). For additional commentary on NLRB policy changes, see generally Julius Cohen &
Lillian Cohen, The National Labor Relations Board in Retrospect, I INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 648 (1948); Flynn, supra note 5; Lee Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase I, 46 OHIo
ST. L.J. 95 (1985).
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controversial and sharply contested labor law issues. 29 It is in these cases,
and not in the well-settled and non-controversial areas of law decided by
unanimous Boards, that one can expect that ideological differences will
surface and have some degree of adjudicative impact.30 As discussed in
that Part, in "important, complex cases,"31 Republican administration
Boards have ruled in favor of management, and Democratic administration
Boards have ruled in favor of unions and employees. Part IV explores
certain implications of ideological voting on the NLRB.
II. THE NLRA AND THE NLRB
In 1935 the United States Congress passed, and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed into law, the NLRA, "the most dramatic statutory assault
on corporate prerogatives in American history. 32  As amended, this
important (and controversial) 33 federal labor law contains a representation
29. Cf. James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1679 (1999)
(studying judicial behavior and examining "divisive" federal appeals court "cases that
present close, controversial issues").
30. See Sunstein et al., supra note 23, at 306, 309 (arguing that it is expected that
ideology plays a "large role" in "ideologically contested" areas of law); see also Edwards,
The Judicial Function, supra note 17, at 857 (arguing that decisionmaking in "very hard"
cases is influenced by political or ideological considerations).
31. Cooke et al., supra note 10, at 254; see also id. at 255 (noting that Board member
preferences for employers or unions "appear to affect decisions on no more than roughly
20% of [unfair labor practice] complaints decided by the Board").
32. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1397 (1993); see also Moe, supra note
13, at 1096 ("The NLRB was a quintessential product of the New Deal. It was created by a
Democratic president and Congress as an administrative means of stabilizing labor-
management relations, and, as such, was part of a much larger attempt to regulate and
manage an economy that had gone spiraling out of control." (footnote omitted)).
33. Reporting on the "bitter struggle over the passage of the... Act in 1935," an article
by Julius Cohen and Lillian Cohen noted that "[t]his struggle did not subside when the
Board finally won legislative approval; it just took on different form." Cohen & Cohen,
supra note 28, at 648.
[I]mmediately after the creation of the Board the same pressures that were
vainly exerted to prevent the Board from being conceived persisted to make
sure that even if the Board were born, it would be only a "still-life" birth. These
pressures took such forms as the report of the National Lawyer's Committee of
the American Liberty League "adjudging" the NLRA unconstitutional, the
whipping up of adverse public opinion through a hostile press, the widespread
ignoring of the act by many employers, and the [tying] up of the Board by a
mass of injunction suits during the first year of its existence.
Id. at 648-49. Of course, the argument that the Act was unconstitutional ultimately failed.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (rejecting constitutional
challenges to the Act and concluding that "the Act is valid as here applied"); NLRB v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937) (applying Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'s
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election procedure, in which private-sector workers can vote for or against
labor organizations seeking governmental certification as the employees'
collective bargaining representative,34 and prohibits certain employer and
union unfair labor practices.35
The NLRA created the NLRB and empowered the agency to
administer and enforce the Act.36 Under the statute as enacted in 1935, the
Board was comprised of three members appointed to five-year terms by the
President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.37 In
1947 Congress amended the Act and, among other things, added two
additional Board members (with the President designating one member to
serve as the chair) and a General Counsel.38 It has been suggested that this
1947 conversion of the Board "from a multimember board of three... into
an agency with two separate and generally independent branches-a five-
member board and a General Counsel-was achieved by particular men in
order to produce particular results."3 9 On that view, those favoring the
analysis of the validity of the Act to the case at hand).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) ("Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment .... ); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (providing that NLRB will
process election petitions and, where appropriate, will conduct secret ballot elections and
certify the results thereof).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b) (defining what constitutes unfair labor practices by an
employer and a labor organization); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (authorizing Board to
remedy unfair labor practices).
36. See ROBERT A. GoRMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 2.1, at 9 (2d ed. 2004) ("Congress in 1935
created an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board, to implement both
the unfair labor practice provisions ... and the representation provisions ... of the Labor
Act.").
37. See FRANK W. MCCULLOCH & TIM BORNsTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 23 (1974) ("Congress created a new National Labor Relations Board composed of
three members to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate."). Board
members can be removed for cause by the President "for neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office, but for no other cause." 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (addressing the composition of the Board and the
appointment and tenure of its members).
39. Seymour Scher, The Politics of Agency Organization, 15 W. POL. Q. 328, 328
(1962). Scher argues that the separation of the Board and the General Counsel
was the result of attitudes toward the Board of key senior members of the House
and the Republican leadership in the Senate .... The dominant view of the
Republican-Southern Democratic majority in the House considered separation
as a device to dilute the anti-employer bias of the agency and to make the
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1947 amendments "objected not so much to the particular allocation of
specialized tasks under the over-all control of the three-man Wagner Act
Board as, more urgently, to the kinds of decisions that emerged through
this structure." 40 Thus, those "who viewed the Wagner Act as unfair to
employers and saw the Board as an agency hopelessly biased in favor of
unions and unionization urged some kind of architectural overhaul of the
agency along with substantive changes in the law."4'
As a matter of custom, and not law, no more than three of the five
NLRB members may belong to the President's political party.42 Board
members, performing a quasi-judicial function, consider and decide cases
via a process of case-by-case adjudication.43 Unlike most agencies, the
Board rarely resorts to substantive rulemaking." While the NLRA grants
the Board the authority to make rules and regulations,45 the United States
40. Id. at 329.
41. Id.
42. See GOULD, supra note 12, at 15 ("Traditionally, the Board consists of three
members of the president's own party and two members of the opposition. In contrast to the
situation in other regulatory agencies-most of which are also quasi-judicial-this political
allocation is a matter of custom, not of law."). Thus, like the statutes creating the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, the NLRA does not require political balance on the Board.
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMrN. L. REv. 1111, 1139 (2000).
43. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 359 (2002) ("Independently, the
NLRB, as a .. . quasi-judicial body, reviews the unfair labor practice decisions of
administrative law judges."); Mozart G. Ratner, Policy-Making by the New "Quasi-
Judicial" NLRB, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 12, 12 (1955) (noting that the Board exercises quasi-
judicial functions).
44. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK 183 (2005); James J. Brudney,
Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221,
234 (2005) ("over its seventy year history the Board has chosen to operate virtually
exclusively through adjudication, eschewing its rulemaking authority"); Andrew P. Morriss
et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 180 (2005) (stating that
historically "[w]hile a few agencies, most notably the National Labor Relations Board,
operated through case-by-case adjudication rather than rulemaking, this was the exception
rather than the norm"); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1383, 1399 (2004) (noting NLRB's "heavy reliance on adjudication as a way of
making policy"); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527, 1565 (2002) (noting the Board's "fail[ure] to use its rulemaking powers");
Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 573-74 (1970) (noting that the Board
exercises its adjudicatory authority much more often than its rulemaking authority).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2000) (granting the NLRB the power to make, amend and
rescind rules and regulations); see also Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991)
(discussing NLRB's broad rulemaking powers).
Federal administrative agencies formulate law and policy through rulemaking and
adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking
provision mandating general notice of proposed rulemaking, comments by interested
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Supreme Court has made clear that "the Board is not precluded from
announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and.., the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the
Board's discretion.,
46
As mentioned earlier, Board members are appointed to five-year
terms47 by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.48 For
persons, and issuance of a final rule); 5 U.S.C. § 554 (APA provision governing agency
adjudication: the agency "in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate
a controversy or remove uncertainty"); see also Magill, supra note 44 (discussing
administrative agency choices in performing delegated regulatory task); Jim Rossi,
Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to
Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 763, 769-73 (distinguishing
agency rulemaking and adjudication).
46. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); see also NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969) (plurality opinion) (stating that
adjudicated cases "serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency policies" and "generally
provide a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in future cases").
47. Professor and former NLRB chair Bill Gould argues that the five-year term plays a
political role in the Board's operations. "As a result, the Board is exposed-not only to the
politics governing the initial appointment and confirmation process, which inevitably
generate policy discussions-but also to political pressures from Congress and the president
each time a member comes up for reappointment." GOULD, supra note 12, at 125. As
members "generally choose to stay in Washington" upon the expiration of their terms, "they
are almost inevitably affected by the political environment and the necessity to survive in
it." Id. at 293. This problem could be avoided, in Gould's view, by limiting Board
members to a nonrenewable seven- or eight-year term. Id. at 126.
48. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Given recent developments, it may
be more accurate to say that it is not that the President appoints NLRB members with the
Senate's advice and consent, but that the Senate nominates Board members with the
President's concurrence. As Bill Gould reports, in the early 1990s the Bush administration,
seeking to accommodate the National Right to Work Committee on the right and Senate
Democrats on the left, "put together informal 'packages' of nominees." GOULD, supra note
12, at 39. Republicans advised President Clinton that their support for Gould's 1993
nomination to the Board would be withheld pending the President's presentation of a
"complete package of nominees for the remaining open positions on the Board . .. and
consulted with the [Senate Labor and Human Resources] Committee Republicans and the
business community regarding those nominees." Id. (quoting Letter from Republican
Senator Nancy Kassebaum to President Clinton (Oct. 29, 1993)). This "batching" of NLRB
nominees links the appointments of Democratic appointees to Republican appointees, and
vice versa, with the package, and not individual nominees, approved by the Senate. See
Michael Ashley Stein, Hardball, Politics, and the NLRB, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
507, 509-10 (2001) (book review) (noting that the Board under Gould was weaker due to
this "batching"); see also Jonathan P. Hiatt & Craig Becker, Drift and Division on the
Clinton NLRB, 16 LAB. LAW. 103, 103 (2000) (noting that President Clinton's appointments
to the Board were "the product of negotiation between the Democratic president and the
Republican-controlled [S]enate"); John C. Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the NLRB:
The Continuing Problem of Delays in Decision Making and the Clinton Board's Response,
16 LAB. LAW. 1, 4 n. 12 (2000) (noting the practice of batched appointments and arguing that
batching causes extended vacancies on the Board as vacancies remain open until packages
are assembled and presented to the Senate for confirmation).
2006]
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the first eighteen years of the agency's existence, "most Board members
were drawn from government or academia-never from industry or
labor, 'A9 and "the notion of appointing someone from the management or
union side to the Labor Board was considered completely verboten; it was
generally agreed that such a person could not possibly be fair to both sides,
much less be perceived as such."50 This practice changed in November
1952 with the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first
Republican elected to the presidency since the 1935 enactment of the
NLRA.51 In 1953 Eisenhower appointed management lawyer Guy Farmer
to the chairmanship of the Board as well as Albert Beeson, a non-lawyer
industrial relations director. 2  Eisenhower's departure from the
nomination-of-neutrals norm was not followed by Democratic Presidents
John F. Kennedy or Lyndon B. Johnson, as both appointed Board members
who were not from union or management backgrounds.53 Thereafter, in
1970, Republican President Richard M. Nixon nominated management
lawyer Edward B. Miller and other management-side members; since that
time, "a majority of the Board members appointed have come from
management or union-side rather than neutral backgrounds.
514
III. IDEOLOGICAL VOTING EXEMPLARS
This Part focuses on thirteen areas of NLRB law and policy in which
ideology-the political party of the appointing president, the Board
member's political party, and the member's pre-Board professional
background-have played an observable and influential role.5
49. Flynn, supra note 5, at 1364-65.
50. Id. at 1364.
51. See B. Glenn George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work
Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667, 668 n.14 (1985) ("The election of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower in November 1952 resulted in the first Republican administration
since the creation of the Board in 1935."). For more on Eisenhower's appointments to the
Board, see generally Seymour Scher, Regulatory Agency Control Through Appointment:
The Case of the Eisenhower Administration and the NLRB, 23 J. POL. 667 (1961).
52. Flynn, supra note 5, at 1368-69. Eisenhower also continued to appoint neutrals to
the agency. See GROSS, supra note 1, at 98, 125, 129, 151-52, 343 n.8 (discussing
Eisenhower's appointments).
53. Flynn, supra note 5, at 1378.
54. Id. at 1365.
55. Facts relative to the ideology (as defined herein) of Board members referenced in
this Part are set forth in the Appendix to this Article.
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A. Regulating Election Campaign Misrepresentations
One of the NLRB's core functions is conducting representation
elections. Seeking "to insure that the voters have the opportunity of
exercising a reasoned, untrammeled choice for or against labor
organizations seeking representation rights,"56 the Board has declared that it
strives "to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly as ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees. 57 The Board has emphasized that, when this
standard is not met, "the experiment must be conducted over again" and
election results must be set aside and a new election held.
58
The question whether the Board should set aside elections where
misrepresentations have been communicated to employees by employers or
unions during campaigns has been answered in the affirmative and the
negative by different Boards. In its 1962 decision in Hollywood Ceramics
Co., 9 the Board--Chairman Frank McCulloch and Members John Fanning
and Gerald Brown-ruled that elections "should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery,
which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which
prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply," and the
misrepresentation "may reasonably be expected to have a significant
impact on the election. '6°
Hollywood Ceramics was subsequently overruled by the full five-
member Board61 in Shopping Kart Food Markets, Inc.62 Members John
Penello and Peter Walther, with the concurrence of Chairman Betty
Murphy and over the dissents of Members Fanning and Howard Jenkins,
held that the Board would "no longer set elections aside on the basis of
misleading campaign statements," and would only intervene where a party
to an election proceeding used deceptive practices involving the NLRB or
"forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize the
propaganda for what it is."' 63 In their view, employees are not "nayve and
unworldly" individuals, but are instead "mature individuals who are
capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting
56. Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69 (1962).
57. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 127, 127 (1948).
58. Id.
59. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
60. Id. at 224.
61. Board cases are typically decided by three-member panels. In complex or novel
cases "or ones with issues on which certain Board members have no known positions," all
five Board members may participate and issue decisions. See EDWARD B. MILLER, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB 76-77 (rev. ed. 1980).
62. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
63. Id. at 1313.
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it.,,64
Shopping Kart lived for only twenty months before it was interred (as
we will see, only temporarily) by General Knit of California, Inc.
65
Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, the Shopping Kart dissenters,
outvoted Member Penello and resurrected the Hollywood Ceramics regime.
Fanning and Jenkins stated that they would "adhere strictly" to the
Hollywood Ceramics standard, would "apply that standard equally to both
sides," and would reduce the likelihood of delays in election certifications
and the commencement of collective bargaining by acting "expeditiously
on objections involving alleged misrepresentations.,
66
Subsequently, in 1982, the Board flip-flopped again, holding in
Midland National Insurance Co. 67 that Hollywood Ceramics and General
Knit were overruled and that the law was being returned to the rule of
Shopping Kart. Chairman John Van de Water and Members Robert Hunter
and Don Zimmerman (with Members Fanning and Jenkins in dissent)
acknowledged "that reasonable, informed individuals can differ, and indeed
have differed, in their assessment of the effect of misrepresentations on
voters and in their views of the Board's proper role in policing such
misrepresentations. 68  Convinced that Shopping Kart's line between
objectionable and unobjectionable campaign speech produced "predictable
and speedy' 69 results and reduced the incentive for lengthy litigation, the
Board reasoned that employees were mature individuals capable of
recognizing and discounting campaign propaganda.7 ° In overruling prior
case law, the Board relied upon its cumulative experience and noted that
the experimental flexibility enjoyed by administrative agencies allows the
64. Id. Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting, conceded that in some instances "we
have considered employees 'naive,' 'unworldly,' and easily swayed by a self-serving
campaign." Id. at 1315 (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting in part).
Notwithstanding that concession, they adhered to Hollywood Ceramics and the "firm belief
that employees should be afforded a degree of protection from overzealous campaigners
who distort the issues by substantial misstatements of relevant and material facts within the
special knowledge of the campaigner, so shortly before the election that there is no effective
time for reply." Id. (emphasis omitted).
65. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
66. Id. at 623. In his dissent Member Penello argued that the Hollywood Ceramics
standards were "vague and flexible" and delayed the onset of the parties' collective
bargaining. Id. at 626 (Member Penello, dissenting). Member and former Chairman
Murphy also dissented, arguing that "the Board has neither the qualifications, the practical
experience, nor the resources to make valid psychological assessments of the actual effects
of a given statement on the behavior of a given set (or group of subsets) of employees." Id.
at 635 (Member Murphy, dissenting).
67. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
68. Id. at 130.
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. at 131-32.
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Board to change its policy positions.1 Weighing the benefits of the
Shopping Kart rule against the possibility that some voters would be misled
by campaign misrepresentations, the Board sided with Shopping Kart and
announced that the agency "will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of
the parties' campaign statements, . ..will not set elections aside on the
basis of misleading campaign statements," and will only set aside an
election "where a party has used forged documents which render the voters
unable to recognize propaganda for what it is."
7 2
As can be seen, in this area of Board law and policy, changes in
presidential administrations and in the composition of the Board
corresponded with and can be explained by ideology. Hollywood
Ceramics, decided by Democratic President John F. Kennedy's appointees
McCulloch and Brown (both Democrats with government service
experience) and Eisenhower appointee Fanning (a Democrat with a
background in government), 73  regulated certain campaign
misrepresentations. Shopping Kart's deregulatory regime was put into
place by Republican President Richard M. Nixon's appointee Penello (a
Democrat with government experience) and Republican President Gerald
R. Ford's nominees Walther and Murphy, individuals with management-
representation backgrounds; Fanning and Kennedy appointee Jenkins (a
Republican with government and academic experience) did not prevail in
their efforts to save Hollywood Ceramics. General Knit's return to the
Hollywood Ceramics rule resulted from Fanning's and Jenkins' willingness
to overrule Shopping Kart, a position not taken by Republican appointee
Penello. And, from the "if at first you don't succeed" approach to Board
law, in Midland National, Van de Water and Hunter, Republicans
appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan, joined with Democratic
President James Earl Carter's nominee Zimmerman (an Independent) in
returning the law to Shopping Kart, with Fanning and Jenkins finding
themselves in the minority yet again. The moves toward and away from
regulation of misrepresentations tracked the election returns and the NLRB
appointments by Republican and Democratic presidents.
71. See id. at 132.
72. Id. at 133. Relegated once again to the role of dissenters, Members Fanning and
Jenkins commented on the "seesawing of Board doctrine," id. at 133, and expressed their
puzzlement concerning the majority's distinction between unregulated fraud and regulated
forgery. See id at 133-34 (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting). In their view, the
Midland National Board abandoned employees "to the mercies of unscrupulous
campaigners" and the "expert cadre of professional molders who devise campaigns for
many of our representation elections." Id. at 134.
73. See Appendix to this Article.
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B. Dissemination of Plant Closing Threats
Another important issue relative to employee organizational efforts
and employer speech involves the question whether the Board should
presume that an employer's unlawful threat to close a facility in the event
of unionization is disseminated to employees other than the worker who
heard the threat. Recognition of a presumption of dissemination warrants
setting aside an employer election victory (i.e., a union loss) if the
employer does not rebut the presumption.
Board policy in this area has seesawed along with the occupants of the
White House and their Board appointees. In General Stencils, Inc.,
74
Members Fanning and Ralph Kennedy (but not Chairman Edward Miller)
concluded that a serious threat of plant closure "will, all but inevitably, be
discussed among employees. That is a reality of industrial life which the
Board has long recognized in situations involving not only threats of
closure, but even less serious threats which nevertheless affect every
employee in the unit., 75 The Board thus placed the burden on the employer
of proving the "unlikely event" that the threat remained isolated.
7 6
Fourteen years later, however, the Board refused to set aside an employer's
election win 77 even though a supervisor told an employee that the plant
"will shut down if the Union comes in."78 Reagan appointees Chairman
Donald Dotson and Member Patricia Diaz Dennis, writing in Kokomo Tube
Co., saw no evidence that the supervisor's remark, made more than one
month before the election, had been disseminated to the seventy or eighty
other employees in the election unit.79
The first movement in the more recent seesaw occurred in Springs
74. 195 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972).
75. Id. at 1110.
76. Id. Chairman Miller argued that his "colleagues, under the guise of an evidentiary
presumption, have erected in fact a rule of law that dissemination of every threat will be
conclusively presumed." Id. at 1114 (Chairman Miller, dissenting). In his view, "it makes
no sense whatever to permit the only witness who heard a threat to testify that the threat was
made but to remain silent on the question whether he disclosed the threat to any other
employee." Id. Reasoning that "nondissemination is virtually impossible to prove except
by the denial of most or all of the employees in the affected group," Miller refused to place
the burden of proof of nondissemination on the employer. Id.
77. Thirty-five votes were cast for, and forty votes were cast against, the Union.
Kokomo Tube Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 357, 359 n.1 (1986).
78. Id. at 358 (quoting supervisor).
79. Member Johansen voted to set aside the election on the basis of the supervisor's
remark, as he would "infer dissemination" of the "serious threat, effectively warning that
not only [the employee who heard the threat] but all employees would lose their jobs if they
voted for the Union." Id. at 359 (Member Johansen, dissenting). Further noting that the
Union lost the election by just five votes, Johansen refused to view and treat the supervisor's
statement as "de minimis." Id.
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Industries, Inc. ° There, Chairman John Truesdale and Members Sarah Fox
and Wilma Liebman overruled Kokomo Tube (Member Peter Hurtgen
dissented), noting that the "Board's traditional practice is to presume
dissemination of at least the most serious threats, such as threats of plant
closure, absent evidence to the contrary."81  Addressing a supervisor's
closure threat communicated to three employees, one of whom testified that
she told "everybody on break, 82 the Board concluded that "it is reasonable
to presume that this hallmark threat, which would severely and equally
affect all employees in the plant, was discussed more widely among
employees than just those employees 'on break.' ' 83  In the absence of
employer evidence rebutting this presumption, the Board found that the
threat was sufficient to affect the election results and set aside the
employer's election win.84
In 2004 the seesaw tipped in the other direction. Crown Bolt, Inc.
85
overruled Springs Industries, General Stencils, "and all other decisions in
which the Board has presumed dissemination of plant-closure threats or
other kinds of coercive statements, to the extent that those decisions so
presume., 86 Chairman Robert Battista and Members Peter Schaumber and
Ronald Meisburg opined that "the Springs Industries presumption is
contrary to the general rule that the burden of proof should rest on the party
who 'seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore
naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or
persuasion."' 87 Members Liebman and Dennis Walsh dissented, arguing
that "historically, the Board has rightly placed on the employer the burden
to prove what would be a highly idiosyncratic fact-namely, that contrary
to every likelihood, employees did not talk with each other about their
employer's plant-closure threat. 8  Placing the burden on the union
"ignores the reality that employees are often reluctant, even afraid, to
testify against their employer, complicating the burden on the objecting
80. 332 N.L.R.B. 40 (2000).
81. Id. at 40.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Member Hurtgen posited that there should be no presumption that threats of plant
closure are disseminated, and he "would decide these cases based on facts, not on legal
presumptions" and "would follow the well-established principle that the burden of proof is
on the objecting party," in this case, the Union. Id. (Member Hurtgen, dissenting in part).
85. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Nov. 29, 2004).
86. Id., slip op. at 4.
87. Id., slip op. at 2 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 428 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)). These Board members thus agreed with the positions previously
taken by Chairman Miller, see supra note 76, and Member Hurtgen, see supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
88. Crown Bolt, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 86, slip op. at 6-7 (Members Liebman and Walsh,
dissenting in part).
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89
What role did ideology play in the Board's journey from General
Stencils to Crown Bolt? In General Stencils, Eisenhower appointee
Fanning (a Democrat with a government service background) and Nixon
appointee Kennedy (a Republican with a government service background)
recognized the presumption, and Nixon appointee Miller, a management-
side Republican, did not.90 In Kokomo Tube, Reagan appointees Dotson
and Dennis, both from the employer representation side of the labor-
management divide, did not presume dissemination; that decision was
subsequently overruled in Springs Industries by Clinton appointees
Truesdale (a Democrat with a government service background) and union-
side Democrats Fox and Liebman over the dissent of management-side
Republican Hurtgen. Bush appointees Battista, Schaumber, and Meisburg,
all Republicans with management representation backgrounds, rejected the
dissemination presumption doctrine in Crown Bolt, with Democrats
Liebman and Walsh in dissent. The ideological voting pattern is clear-
unlike other Board members, management-side Republican Board
members appointed by Republican presidents have not presumed the
dissemination of threats.
C. Supervisory Prounion Activity
When, and under what circumstances, does a company supervisor's
prounion activity constitute objectionable conduct warranting the
invalidation of an election?
In its recently issued decision in Harborside Healthcare, Inc.9' the
Board--Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg-held
that prounion conduct by a supervisor is objectionable when the conduct
interferes with employee free choice and materially affects the outcome of
an election.92 In so holding, the Board overruled precedent requiring
evidence of an express promise or threat by the prounion supervisor, as the
Board had concluded in Pacific Physicians Services, Inc. , decided by
Members James Stephens, Dennis Devaney, and Charles Cohen; Sutter
Roseville Medical Center,94 decided by Chairman William Gould and
Members Fox and John Higgins; Pacific Micronesia Corp.,9' decided by
Chairman Gould and Members Fox and J. Robert Brame; and Millsboro
89. Id., slip op. at 7.
90. See Appendix to this Article.
91. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (Dec. 8, 2004).
92. Id., slip op. at 1.
93. 313 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1994).
94. 324 N.L.R.B. 218 (1997).
95. 326 N.L.R.B. 458 (1998).
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Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. ,96 decided by Members Liebman and
Brame over the partial dissent of Member Hurtgen.
Restating the applicable legal standard, the Harborside Board set forth
a two-prong test 97 to be applied when asking whether laboratory election
conditions9" have been upset by a supervisor's prounion activity: (1)
whether the supervisor's "conduct reasonably tended to coerce or interfere
with the employees' exercise of free choice in the election," and (2)
"[w]hether the conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent that
it materially affected the outcome of the election." 99 In addition, the Board
held that a supervisor's solicitation of union authorization cards "has an
inherent tendency to interfere with the employee's freedom to choose to
sign a card or not."'100 This solicitation may now be objectionable even
though, under prior Board case law, it was "not objectionable where
'nothing in the words, deeds, or atmosphere of a supervisor's request for
authorization cards contains the seeds of potential reprisal, punishment, or
intimidation.'"'101
Dissenting Members Liebman and Walsh argued that, "without the
benefit of briefing .... the majority's new test signals a radical break with
the Board's established approach.' ' 0 2 In their view, the new test shifted the
analytical focus from "the possibility of employee coercion: the fear of
retaliation or the hope of reward," to the question whether the supervisor's
conduct reasonably tended to coerce or interfere with employee free
choice.'0 3 Consequently, supervisory conduct interfering with an election
could be found even though the employer communicated its antiunion
position to employees "and even where employees cannot reasonably fear
retaliation or hope for a reward based on the supervisor's conduct."'
0 4
Furthermore, the dissenters continued, the Board's holding that supervisory
solicitation of authorization cards may be objectionable
puts unions in an extraordinarily difficult position. To avoid
creating a basis for setting aside an election, unions must now
avoid using any person who might later be found to be a statutory
96. 327 N.L.R.B. 879 (1999).
97. The Board adopted the test articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Harborside Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 230 F.3d 206, 214 (6th Cir. 2000).
98. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
99. Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 4 (Dec. 8, 2004); see
also id. (setting forth the factors to be considered in making this determination).
100. Id., slip op. at 6.
101. Millsboro, 327 N.L.R.B. at 880 (quoting NLRB v. San Antonio Portland Cement
Co., 611 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1980)).
102. Harborside, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 10 (Members Liebman and Walsh,
dissenting).
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id.
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supervisor to solicit authorization cards. Making such
supervisory determinations is, to say the least, difficult even for
the Board.' 05
Thus, unions may "err on the side of caution" and exclude solicitors "who
might be natural leaders," or may "guess wrong" and utilize employees
who are later found to be supervisors. 10 6 "Either way, employees who want
union representation lose."10 7
Prior to Harborside, Board members of various backgrounds who
were appointed by both Republican and Democratic Presidents did not find
objectionable the prounion conduct of a supervisor where that conduct did
not include explicit threats or promises by the supervisor.0 8 On that view,
prounion supervisory conduct alone did not constitute objectionable
conduct warranting the setting aside of an election. That position has now
been rejected by Republican management-side appointees of a Republican
President who have also determined that supervisory solicitation of
authorization cards inherently interferes with (and therefore increases
employers' opportunities to overturn union wins in) elections. This
movement of the law to a more employer-friendly and union-unfriendly
rule is an example of the vote-predictive ideology discussed herein.
D. Are Medical Interns and Residents "Employees "?
Over the years the Board has grappled with the following question:
whether NLRA Section 2(3)109 applies to and provides statutory coverage
for persons working as medical interns, residents, and clinical fellows
(commonly referred to as house staff).
Answering the foregoing question negatively in St. Clare's Hospital &
Health Center, ° the Board (Members Jenkins, Murphy, Penello, and
Walther, with Chairman Fanning dissenting) denied a union motion for
reconsideration of its dismissal of a petition for an election in a unit of a
hospital's house staff. "Since the individuals are rendering services which
105. Id. at 15; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000) (defining the statutory term "supervisor").
106. Harborside, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 15 (Members Liebman and Walsh,
dissenting).
107. Id.
108. See Appendix to this Article.
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3):
The term "employee" shall include any employee ... but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor ....
110. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
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are directly related to-and indeed constitute an integral part of-their
educational program, they are serving primarily as students and not
primarily as employees." 1" Emphasizing "the discretionary authority left
to us by Congress in the 1974 health care amendments,"'1 12 the Board
opined "that when an individual is providing services at the educational
institution itself as part and parcel of his or her educational development
the individual's interest in rendering such services is more academic than
economic. . . . [W]e do not think that such a relationship should be
regulated through collective bargaining."
'1 13
Thereafter, in its 1999 ruling in Boston Medical Center Corp,114 the
Board-Chairman Truesdale and Members Fox and Liebman--overruled
St. Clare's and other decisions. Turning away from over twenty years of
case law, the Board concluded that interns, residents, and fellows fell
within section 2(3)'s broad definition of "employee" even though "a
purpose of their being at a hospital may also be, in part, educational.' 1 5
Concluding that the "essential elements" of the house staff's relationship
with the medical center "obviously define an employer-employee
relationship,"'1 6 the Board determined that "nothing in the statute suggests
that persons who are students but also employees should be exempted from
the coverage and protection of the Act."' 17 Moreover, the Board continued,
the house staff were unlike traditional students in that they did not pay
tuition or fees, did "not take typical examinations in a classroom setting,"
and did not "receive grades as such."' 1 8 Setting out a number of other
considerations supporting its position that the at-issue members of the
111. Id. at 1002.
112. Id. at 1004.
113. Id. at 1003. The Board noted that
by our finding that housestaff are not "employees," we certainly did not intend
to imply that we were thereby renouncing entirely our jurisdiction over such
individuals. To the contrary, we have indeed asserted jurisdiction over all
classifications at health care institutions ... but feel that extending bargaining
privileges to residents, interns, and fellows would not be in the best interest of
national labor policy.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) (holding
that house staff personnel were primarily students and were therefore not section 2(3)
employees).
114. 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
115. Id. at 160.
116. Id. The Board noted that the house staff worked for the employer, were
compensated for their services, received fringe benefits and were eligible for workers'
compensation, and received paid vacations, sick leaves, and parental and bereavement leave
as well as dental, life health, and malpractice insurance. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 161.
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house staff were statutory employees, 19 the Board declared:
Today, we accord individuals who clearly are employees within
the meaning of the Act the rights that are afforded all such
employees, and likewise impose the responsibilities
commensurate with those rights. We believe that our
interpretation of the statute, informed by analysis of the facts here
and experience, is a reasonable one that takes into account the
entire nature of the house staff-hospital relationship.
120
The Board members with management backgrounds dissented.
Writing that the Board may but is not compelled to treat house staff as
employees, Member Hurtgen argued that "the Board makes a policy choice
to include or exclude the group at issue."'12 1 Seeing no reason to depart
from prior case law, he posited that "as a policy matter, the Board should
continue to exercise its discretion to exclude" house staff, especially where
there were no changed circumstances warranting a "change [in] long-
standing precedent."' 1 2  "I would not alter longstanding and workable
precedent simply because of a change in Board membership. In my view,
the interests of stability and predictability in the law require that established
precedent be reversed only upon a showing of manifest need. There is no
such showing here.' 23
In his separate dissent Member Brame argued that the Board's
overruling of precedent "places in jeopardy the finest system of medical
education in the world."'' 24 Sharing his understanding of the history and
current methodology of medical education in the United States, Brame
contended that medical residents are students who work at (and not for) a
hospital, provide direct patient care as "an indispensable component of
[their] medical education, ' ' 1z' and receive stipends, not as compensation for
their services but "for the purpose of supporting the individual during a
lengthy graduate education program."'126 Rejecting the majority's holding
and analysis, Brame wrote that granting employee status to house staff was
inconsistent with several fundamental policies of the NLRA. 127  Opining
119. Seeid. at 161-64.
120. Id. at 164.
121. Id. at 168 (Member Hurtgen, dissenting).
122. Id. at 169.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 170 (Member Brame, dissenting).
125. Id. at 176.
126. Id. at 177.
127. See id. at 178-80. Brame opined that the Congress enacting the NLRA sought to
restore the equality of bargaining power between employees and employers and that the Act
is based on a fundamental conflict between employers and employees engaged in collective
bargaining and anticipates and allows the use of economic weapons by parties to collective
negotiations in support of their bargaining positions. Id. at 178. The Board's finding that
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that the Board "thus forces medical education into the uncharted waters of
organizing campaigns, collective bargaining, and strikes," '128 Brame
predicted: "If the majority is successful in this endeavor, American
graduate medical education will be irreparably harmed.
1 29
Which Board members favored employee representational efforts and
voted to support the coverage of medical interns and residents under the
NLRA, and which members agreed with hospital employers that
individuals in medical house staff positions are students with no collective
bargaining rights? Boston Medical Center's conclusion that interns,
residents, and fellows are statutory employees was announced by three
Democratic appointees of a Democratic president, one with prior service in
government and two with union-side backgrounds prior to taking their seats
on the Board, over the dissent of two management-side Republicans. 3 °
Boston Medical Center overruled Board precedent issued by members
appointed by Republican Presidents Nixon and Ford;13' in St. Clare's, for
example, two of those appointees had pre-Board management backgrounds.
It is apparent that member votes in these cases are consistent with member
ideology.
E. Are Graduate Assistants "Employees"?
Ideological voting can also be observed in the Board's responses to
the question whether university graduate assistants are employees under
and within the meaning of NLRA section 2(3).132
In New York University,133 Chairman Truesdale and Members
Liebman and Hurtgen held that certain university graduate assistants were
statutory employees eligible to vote in a Board-conducted election sought
and petitioned for by the United Auto Workers (UAW). The assistants,
house staff are employees is inconsistent with these policies, Brame argued, as the "primary
purpose for which a physician undertakes a residency . . . is to gain certification in a
specialty-not the wages, benefits, or working conditions that the residency program
affords." Id. Collective bargaining is a "poor fit" in the context of "graduate medical
education, which is to a large degree controlled by national accrediting agencies
independent of the putative employer." Id. at 179. And "once residents are found to be
Section 2(3) employees, they must possess the same statutory rights, including the right to
strike, as other health care employees." Id.
128. Id. at 182.
129. Id.
130. See Appendix to this Article.
131. As noted in the text's discussion of St. Clare's Hospital, Member Jenkins, a
Republican appointed by Democratic President Kennedy, agreed with the view that house
staff were not covered by section 2(3). Chairman Fanning, a Democrat appointed by
Republican President Eisenhower, dissented in that case.
132. See supra note 109 for the text of this section.
133. 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
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graduate students employed as teachers or researchers, worked under the
direction and control of the University's departments and programs, were
compensated for their services through the University's payroll system, and
spent fifteen percent of their time performing graduate assistant duties.
The assistants' "relationship with the Employer is thus indistinguishable
from a traditional master-servant relationship," the Board determined, and
they "plainly and literally fall within the meaning of 'employee' as defined
in Section 2(3).', 1 4 The assistants were "no less 'employees' than part-time
or other employees of limited tenure or status," '135 and the fact that their
work was primarily educational did not mean that they were not employees
as the "educational benefits" flowing from such work was not a
requirement for a graduate degree in most of the University's
departments. 136
The University made, and the Board rejected, two policy-based
arguments. First, the Board was not persuaded by the argument that the at-
issue graduate students did not have a traditional economic relationship
with the University; in the Board's view, the working conditions of the
assistants and the regular faculty did not differ. Second, the Board rejected
the assertion that the recognition of bargaining rights for graduate students
would infringe upon the University's academic freedom. Noting its three-
decades long experience with and assertion of jurisdiction over private
colleges and universities, 37 the Board was confident that "the parties can
confront any issues of academic freedom as they would any other issue in
collective bargaining. ' 38 Stating that "we cannot say as a matter of law or
policy that permitting graduate assistants to be considered employees
entitled to the benefits of the Act will result in improper interference with
the academic freedom of the institution they serve,"'139 the Board declined
to "deprive workers who are compensated by, and under the control of, a
statutory employer of their fundamental statutory rights to organize and
bargain with their employer, simply because they are also students."'
140
Subsequent to the Board's decision, New York University bargained with
the Union, thereby becoming the only private university in the United
134. Id. at 1206.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1207.
137. See id at 1208 (noting that the Board has asserted jurisdiction over private colleges
and universities and has approved bargaining units of faculty members and citing relevant
cases).
138. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. at 1209.
140. Id. Concurring, Member Hurtgen emphasized that "the graduate students involved
herein do not perform their services as a necessary and fundamental part of their studies.
Thus, I regard the [assistants] as employees who should have the right to bargain
collectively." Id. (Member Hurtgen, concurring).
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States with union-represented graduate students. 141
New York University did not survive a subsequent presidential election
and new appointments to the NLRB. In Brown University, 42 Chairman
Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg concluded that the
"principal time commitment" of Brown University's teaching assistants,
research assistants, and proctors "is focused on obtaining a degree and,
thus, being a student., 143 The assistants received financial aid and were not
paid for their work, the Board noted, and their graduate status and pursuit
of a Ph.D. degree were "inextricably linked" and "clearly educational."'
44
Invoking the University's right to academic freedom (a consideration
raised, to no avail, by the University in New York University) the Board
stated that the "imposition of collective bargaining on the relationship
between a university and its graduate student assistants ... would limit the
university's freedom to determine a wide range of matters" and would
"intrude on the core academic freedoms in a manner simply not present in
cases involving faculty employees.' ' 145 Declaring that the Board's "25-year
pre-NYU principle of regarding graduate students as nonemployees was
sound and well reasoned,"' 146 the Board accordingly overruled New York
University.
Questioning the majority's approach to the workplaces of
contemporary academies, Members Liebman and Walsh dissented. In their
view, the fact that the graduate assistants' "employment relationship is not
the 'primary' relationship with their employer" was no reason to exclude
the assistants from the Act's coverage. " 47  Moreover, they noted, the
assistants worked under the control and direction of the University;
performed and were compensated for their services by stipends, health fees,
and tuition payments; and received compensation for matters not related to
academic achievement, with income taxes withheld and a showing of
141. See Alan Finder, NYU. Ends Negotiations with Union for Students, N.Y. TIMEs
(Aug. 6, 2005), at A13 (describing the University's claim that union's grievances
endangered its academic rights).
142. 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (July 13, 2004).
143. Id., slip op. at 6.
144. Id, slip op. at 7.
145. Id., slip op. at 8 n.26. In the Board's view, granting collective bargaining rights to
graduate assistants would adversely affect the University's faculty and administration, with
"class size, time, length, and location,"; assistants' stipends, hours, and duties; and
"decisions over who, what, and where to teach or research" subject to labor negotiations.
Id., slip op. at 8.
146. Id., slip op. at 5. The pre-NYU cases cited by the Board included Adelphi
University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); Leland Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974); and St.
Clare 's Hospital, 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1997), overruled by Boston Medical Center Corp.,
330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
147. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 14 (Members Liebman and Walsh,
dissenting).
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eligibility under federal immigration laws required. 148 The Board majority
erred, the dissenters argued, "in seeing the academic world as somehow
removed from the economic realm that labor law addresses-as if there
was no room in the ivory tower for a sweatshop., 149 Additionally, Liebman
and Walsh posited that the recognition of collective bargaining rights for
graduate students would not harm academic freedom, as students
"presumably will be reluctant to endanger" that freedom in labor
negotiations. 5 ' Thus, they concluded, "collective bargaining and academic
freedom are not incompatible; indeed, academic freedom for instructors
can be strengthened through collective bargaining."''
Democrats Truesdale (government background) and Liebman (union
background) and Republican Hurtgen (management background), all
appointed by Democratic President Clinton, 152 voted to grant election
voting rights to the at-issue graduate assistants in New York University.
Graduate students at Brown did not fare as well before Republican
President George W. Bush's Republican and management-background
appointees. In sum, union interests and employee representational rights
were recognized and furthered in the Board of a Democratic administration.
When a Republican president took up residence in the White House and the
graduate student issue came back before the Board, the changes in the
Board's composition and the ideologies of the agency's members were
significant as the management view prevailed and New York University
was overruled. With Brown's victory, New York University reexamined
its bargaining relationship with its graduate students' union representative
and recently notified the UAW that the University will not negotiate a new
labor agreement with the Union.'53
148. Id., slip op. at 15.
149. Id., slip op. at 13.
150. Id., slip op. at 18.
151. Id.
152. See Appendix to this Article.
153. See Finder, supra note 141, at A13 (detailing the university's decision to terminate
negotiations with the union due to concern for academic liberties).
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F. Contingent Employment Arrangements
The representational rights of contingent workers 5 4 have been the
subject of NLRB examination and reexamination. In its 2000 MB. Sturgis,
Inc.' 5 decision, a Board comprised of Clinton appointees Chairman
Truesdale and Members Fox and Liebman held that a bargaining unit
"composed of employees who are jointly employed by a user employer and
a supplier employer, and employees who are solely employed by the user
employer, is permissible under the statute without the consent of the
employers. ' 56 Overruling a prior Board decision'57 and rejecting a number
of arguments made by Member Brame, the Board concluded that as "all of
the employees in the unit are employed, either solely or jointly, by the user
employer.... a unit of employees performing work for one user employer
is an 'employer unit' for purposes of Section 9(b)" of the Act.
158
In November 2004 appointees of President George W. Bush-
Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg-overruled
Sturgis. H.S. Care L.L.C.'59 declared that allowing Board elections in
combined units of solely and jointly employed workers "contravenes
Section 9(b) by requiring different employers to bargain together regarding
employees in the same unit. We hold that combined units of solely and
jointly employed employees are multiemployer units and are statutorily
permissible only with the parties' consent."1 60 In so holding, the Board was
concerned that combined-unit bargaining "hampers the give-and-take
process of negotiation between a union and an employer, and places the
154. Contingent workers "may be temporary and outside or independent contractors, and
may be performing functions that were once performed by traditional full-time employees."
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New
Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 17 n.28 (2005). For discussions of the contingent
employment phenomena, see generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); CONTINGENT WORK:
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen
Christensen eds., 1998); Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States,
18 COM. LAB. L.J. 503 (1997).
155. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000).
156. Id. at 1304.
157. See Lee Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1990) (determining that "as a general rule,
the Board does not include employees in the same unit if they do not have the same
employer, absent employer consent"); see also Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250 (1973)
(finding that bargaining units composed of user and supplier employees are multiemployer
units and are not appropriate absent consent of both the user and the supplier employers).
158. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305; see 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000) ("The Board shall
decide -in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this [Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit .....
159. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Nov. 19, 2004).
160. Id., slip op. at 5.
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employers in the position of negotiating with one another as well as with
the union."' 61  Employees could also be adversely affected, the Board
continued, where a union negotiating with different employers "subjects
employees to fragmented bargaining and inherently conflicting interests, a
result that is inconsistent with the Act's animating principles." ''62
The non-management-background members of the Board, Members
Liebman and Walsh, dissented. In their view, NLRA section 9(b) permits a
bargaining unit of solely and jointly employed workers "and, in fact, is
necessary to enable the growing number of employees in alternative work
arrangements to benefit from collective bargaining if they so choose." '163
Viewing the issue from the employees' perspective, Liebman and Walsh
stated, "[s]urely employees who are working side by side, for employers
who have voluntarily created that arrangement, should be able to join
together in the same bargaining unit, if they choose to.'164 Opining that
employers using contingent workers are motivated by a desire to reduce
labor costs and seek to "prevent core and contingent employees alike from
organizing and bargaining effectively,"'' 65 they concluded that "[t]he
majority ... seems to have gone out of its way to make it impossible for
joint employees to exercise their Section 7 rights effectively.9
166
Board members from a management background, rejecting an
interpretation of the Act that would allow the NLRB to establish combined
employee units without employer consent, emphasized the problems such a
unit would create for employers. Members disagreeing with that position
(including, from the union side, Fox and Liebman) focused on the
collective-bargaining benefits of such bargaining for employees working
side by side in the same workplace; for those members, the pertinent and
operative consent was that of the employees and not the employers. That
these views coincide with the members' ideologies is an illustration of this
Article's thesis.
G. Picketing Issues
The legality of union picketing of employer establishments was the
issue before the Board in a set of cases decided in 1961 and 1962.
In February 1961 the Board decided International Hod Carriers
161. Id.
162. Id. For example, the Board stated, where a supplier employer sets the wages of
supplied employees, and a user employer sets the wages of its solely employed workers,
"the wages of the employees of A/B may be traded away, in bargaining, for the sake of
employees of B, or vice versa." Id.
163. Id., slip op. at 8 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting).
164. Id., slip op. at 9.
165. Id., slip op. at 10.
166. Id., slip op. at 12.
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(Calumet Contractors). 167  There, the Board-Eisenhower appointees
Members Leedom, Rodgers, and Joseph Jenkins168--concluded that a
union's picketing of a construction site was done with the intention of
inducing and encouraging workers "to refuse to perform employment
services for their employers, with an object of forcing or requiring [the
employer] to recognize and bargain with [the union] at a time when another
labor organization had been certified by the Board as the representative of
the employer's employees.', 169 That conduct violated section 8(b)(4)(C) of
the Act, 170 the Board stated, since it was clear that the union's picketing,
done for the purpose of informing the public that the employer was not
paying prevailing wages and benefits to its employees, "necessarily had as
its ultimate end the substitution of [the picketing union] for the Christian
Labor Association, the certified bargaining agent.,
1 7
1
Reconsidering and issuing a new decision in the same case less than
eight months later, the Board (Kennedy appointees Chairman McCulloch
and Member Brown and Eisenhower appointee and Democrat Member
Fanning), held (on the same facts) that the Union's "admitted objective to
require [the employer] to conform standards of employment to those
prevailing in the area, is not tantamount to, nor does it have an objective of,
recognition or bargaining.' ' 172 Dissenting Members Rodgers and Leedom
adhered to their original February 1961 decision, repeating their view that
the union's picketing "constitute[d] an attempt to obtain conditions and
concessions normally resulting from collective bargaining.', 173 While the
facts were the same, the outcomes reached by the Eisenhower Board and
the Kennedy Board, separated in time by only eight months, were not. The
union's conduct was an unfair labor practice and then it was not. What
changed? The Board.
In another picketing case, Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel &
Restaurant Employees (Crown Cafeteria),7 4 Chairman McCulloch and
Members Rodgers and Leedom found that a union's picket signs asking
"members of organized labor and their friends" to refuse to patronize the
167. 130 N.L.R.B. 78 (1961).
168. See Appendix to this Article.
169. Calumet Contractors, 130 N.L.R.B. at 82. The Union's picketing targeted a
construction company and a construction contractor's association.
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (2000) (making it unlawful to force or require
employer "to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative
of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees").
171. Calumet Contractors, 130 N.L.R.B. at 81-82.
172. International Hod Carriers (Calumet Contractors), 133 N.L.R.B. 512, 512 (1961).
173. Id. at 513 (Members Rodgers and Leedom, dissenting).
174. 130 N.L.R.B. 570 (1961).
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employer violated Section 8(b)(7) of the Act.175  Concluding that "apart
from the picketing, the Union was in fact demanding present recognition
from" the employer, 76 the Board ruled that the picketing did not fall within
a proviso of section 8(b)(7) 177 protecting and allowing picketing "tak[ing]
the form of truthfully advising the public that the employer is nonunion, or
does not have a union contract.' ' 78  In dissent, Members Fanning and
Jenkins argued that the picketing did not violate the statute as alleged, as
they were convinced that "recognitional or organizational picketing which
truthfully advised the public (including consumers) that the employer did
not have a contract with the union" satisfied the proviso to section 8(b)(7)
so long as the picketing did not "induce[] a stoppage of deliveries or
services."'
179
The Union filed a motion with the Board seeking reconsideration of
the decision, and the Board's General Counsel filed a motion for
"clarification."' 180 In February 1962, one year after the agency had ruled
against the Union, Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown
announced that "[a]fter careful study . . . and in the light of our further
reappraisal of the statutory scheme. . . we now conclude that the dissenting
opinion [in the 1961 decision] more accurately reflects the congressional
intent. Accordingly, we adopt the dissenting opinion in the first
decision."' 8' Hence, the very same picketing found illegal in the Board's
1961 decision was now lawful. Members Rodgers and Leedom, no longer
in the majority, were still convinced that the Union had violated the Act. In
their view, the Union's requests for employer recognition constituted
independent evidence of a non-informational and therefore unlawful object
within the meaning of section 8(b)(7)(C).' 82 Like Calumet Contractors, the
175. Id. at 571; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (stating that a union not currently certified as
employees' collective bargaining representative commits unfair labor practice when it
pickets or threatens to picket an employer "where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such
labor organization as their collective bargaining representative").
176. Crown Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. at 572.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (exempting from picketing prohibition "any picketing
or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers)
that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization" so long as the picketing does not "induce any individual employed by any
other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods
or not to perform any services").
178. Crown Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. at 572.
179. Id. at 577 (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
180. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel and Rest. Employees (Crown Cafeteria), 135
N.L.R.B. 1183, 1184 (1962).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1188 (Members Rodgers and Leedom, dissenting).
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political party of the president appointing members to the Board and the
political affiliations and professional backgrounds of the members were
relevant and influenced the outcomes.
H. Nonmajority Bargaining Orders
As mandated by NLRA section 9(a), an employer must bargain
collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative "designated or
selected" by a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.,"
The usual (and, from the Board's perspective, the preferred) route taken by
unions seeking exclusive bargaining status is the NLRB-conducted election
and certification procedures set forth in section 9(c) of the statute. 84 In
certain instances, however, the Board will not hold or will set aside the
results of an election where the employer has engaged in serious unfair
labor practices. As the Supreme Court made clear in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.,'85 the Board has the authority to issue bargaining orders
where a union has demonstrated the support of a majority of bargaining
unit employees and the employer has committed unfair labor practices that
"have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election
processes."'
186
The Gissel Court noted and left open the question whether
bargaining orders can be issued by the Board "without need of inquiry into
majority status on the basis of [union authorization] cards or otherwise."'
187
NLRB members have answered that question in the affirmative and in the
negative. In United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Ass'n, 88 a majority of a
three-member panel, Members Murphy and Truesdale, said that the
183. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
184. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (stating the guidelines for the election and certification
procedure).
185. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
186. Id. at614.
187. Id. at 613. Support for a union is typically shown by authorization cards signed by
workers who express their desire to have the union represent them for purposes of collective
bargaining. In Gissel the Court quoted the language of one such card:
Desiring to become a member of the above Union of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, I hereby make application for admission to membership. I hereby
authorize you, your agents or representatives to act for me as collective
bargaining agent on all matters pertaining to rates of pay, hours, or any other
conditions of employment.
Id. at 583 n.4. Authorization cards can support bargaining orders because "employees
should be bound by the clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately
and clearly canceled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to
disregard and forget the language above his signature." Id. at 606.
188. 242 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1979).
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agency's "remedial authority under Section 10(c) of the Act may well
encompass the authority to issue a bargaining order in the absence of a
prior showing of majority support.' ' 189 Unlike Murphy and Truesdale, who
declined to issue such an order in the case before them, Chairman Fanning
and Member Jenkins would have issued a nonmajority bargaining order
against the employer.' 90 Member Penello, accusing his colleagues of
"stand[ing] the Act on its head," argued that the Board's remedial power
under section 10(c) did not limit the majority rule principle of section 9(a)
of the Act.'9 ' In his view, granting bargaining representative status to a
union in the absence of majority support is a decision for "Congress, the
body which constructed the Act with the majority rule principle as its
foundation.'
192
Considering the same case on remand from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit,' 93 Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins
and Zimmerman held that a bargaining order was warranted. 94  They
concluded that, notwithstanding the "risk of imposing a minority union on
the employees,"' 95 the order was required given the "gravity, extent, timing,
and constant repetition"' 96 of the employer's violations of the Act and the
company's previous misconduct, which was the subject of another NLRB
decision.' 97
In 1984 when the Board revisited the nonmajority bargaining order
issue in Gourmet Foods, Inc.,'" the law was changed by Chairman Dotson
and Members Dennis and Hunter:
Our own review of the statute, its legislative history, Board and
court precedent, and legal commentary have convinced us that
the majority rule principle is such an integral part of the Act's
current substance and procedure that it must be adhered to in
fashioning a remedy, even in the most "exceptional" cases. We
189. Id. at 1027.
190. See id. at 1032 ("The Board has the authority to issue a nonmajority bargaining
order.").
191. Id. at 1041 (Member Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id. at 1042.
193. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d. 1054, 1056 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that the Board has the authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders in
certain cases and remanding the case for consideration of whether the facts constituted a
level of misconduct justifying the issuance of an order to bargain).
194. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 775 (1981).
195. Id. at 775.
196. Id.
197. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 194 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1095-96 (1972)
(finding that the United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association committed an unfair labor
practice by retaliating against union activity), enforced per curiam, 465 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir.
1972).
198. 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984).
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view the principle as a direct limitation on the Board's existing
statutory remedial authority as well as a policy that would render
improper exercise of any remedial authority to grant nonmajority
bargaining orders which the Board might possess.'99
Accordingly, the Board stated that it did "not believe that [it] would ever be
justified in granting a nonmajority bargaining order remedy.,
20
Member Zimmerman's lone dissent argued that the Board did have the
statutory authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders because the
rights of employees subjected to egregious and flagrant unfair labor
practices "cannot be adequately protected if ... employers are permitted by
the Board to engage in unlawful acts that are so coercive as to prevent
majority support from ever developing."' ' Seeing nothing in the Act or in
the statute's legislative history directing the Board to interpret section 9(a)
as a bar to a remedial nonmajority bargaining order, Zimmerman reasoned
that such an order "entails only a minimal interim encroachment, if at all,
on the majority rule principle. Ultimately, the order is the best available
Board remedy to secure uncoerced majority rule. 20 2
In the United Dairy Farmers litigation, the Board's authority to issue
nonmajority bargaining orders protecting unions and employees was
recognized by several members of various backgrounds who were
appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents.2 3  As noted,
appointees of Republican President Ronald Reagan (from Republican-
management, Republican-government, and Democrat-management
backgrounds, respectively) made clear in Gourmet Foods that the Board
had no such authority. If we can assume that employers would not be in
favor of empowering the Board to issue nonmajority bargaining orders (a
safe assumption), the Reagan Board's movement away from United Dairy
Farmers was predictable when viewed through the prism of ideology.
1. Work-Relocation Decisions
Interesting examples of the Board's ideological voting are found in the
agency's resolution of litigation involving an employer's decision to
relocate work without first notifying or bargaining with its employees'
union representative.
Consider Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co.
(Milwaukee Spring 0.204 Chairman Van de Water and Members Fanning
199. Id. at 583.
200. Id. at 587.
201. Id. at 589 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
202. Id. at 591.
203. See Appendix to this Article.
204. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
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and Jenkins found that an employer's decision to transfer certain assembly
operations from its unionized facility in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to its
nonunion (and lower paying) plant in McHenry, Illinois, constituted a
midterm contract modification prohibited by section 8(d)
205 of the Act.206
The labor agreement between the employer and the Union contained
preamble, recognition, and management rights clauses. The Board
determined that the preamble and the recognition clause 2 7 covered the
Milwaukee facility and did not apply to the employer's other plants.
28
Also, the management rights clause209 did not expressly grant the company
"the right to move, transfer, or change the location of part of its operations.
in order to avoid the comparatively higher labor costs imposed" by the
labor agreement.210
While judicial review of the Board's decision was pending before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Board asked the
court to remand the case for further consideration, and the request was
granted.2 1  Thereafter, in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring
Co. (Milwaukee Spring 11),212 a differently constituted Board-Chairman
Dotson and Members Hunter and Dennis, all appointed by Republican
President Reagan 213-reversed course. Contrary to the position taken in the
original decision, the Board reasoned that the employer's movement of
work from Wisconsin to Illinois did not modify the employer-union labor
agreement since the wages and benefits at the Milwaukee facility were not
disturbed.1 4 Nor did the relocation modify the contract's recognition
clause, the Board concluded, as that clause was not a work preservation
clause 215 and did "not state that the functions that the unit performs must
205. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (prohibiting midterm contract modifications).
206. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 210 ("Respondent, by deciding without the
Union's consent to transfer its assembly operations ... has unlawfully modified the terms
and conditions of [the collective bargaining] agreement ....").
207. The preamble "specifie[d] that Milwaukee Spring's facility is located at a particular
address in Milwaukee," and the recognition clause provided that the employer "recognizes
the Union as the bargaining agent of the production and maintenance employees in the
company's plant in Milwaukee." Id. at 209.
208. Id.
209. The Board noted that this clause reserved to the employer "the right to make
decisions about the types of products to be manufactured, what equipment will be used,
what methods will be used, production schedule-in short, the clause reserves to
management the right to decide whether, and how, its products will be manufactured." Id
at 210.
210. Id.
211. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir.
1983) (unpublished table decision).
212. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984).
213. See Appendix to this Article.
214. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
215. See Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with Implications for
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remain in Milwaukee. ' '216 In dissent, Member Zimmerman (an Independent
appointed by Democratic President Carter) contended that it was
"disingenuous to argue ... that the [employer's] relocation decision did not
disturb the contractual wages and benefits at the Milwaukee facility. If [the
employer] had implemented its decision, there would be no assembly
employees at the Milwaukee facility to receive the contractual wages and
benefits. 21 7
Another work relocation issue presented the Board with the question
whether an employer, not party to a collective bargaining agreement, as the
employer was in the Milwaukee Spring cases, was required to bargain with
its employees' union over the company's decision to move certain
operations. In the Board's 1981 ruling in Otis Elevator Co. (Otis Elevator
1),218 Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Zimmerman held that
the employer violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it did not bargain
over its decision to transfer research and development work from Mahwah,
New Jersey, to its new facility in East Hartford, Connecticut. 29  The
employer's multimillion dollar capital investment in the new facility "did
not signal any change in the direction of [the employer's] activities or in
the character of its enterprise," and bargaining over the decision "would not
have been a significant abridgment of [the employer's] prerogative to carry
on its business activities. 220
Three years later, in Otis Elevator Co. (Otis Elevator l) ,22' a Board
plurality comprised of Reagan appointees, Chairman Dotson and Member
Hunter, rejected the 1981 ruling and held that the employer did not violate
the Act.222 Where an employer's decision "did not turn upon labor costs,"
the decision was not subject to mandatory bargaining, they announced, and
the employer's relocation decision "clearly turned upon a fundamental
change in the nature and direction of the business, and thus was not
amenable to bargaining. '223  Not joined by Members Dennis224 and
Labor Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1747 (1996) (noting that a work preservation clause
"guarantees some measure of job security to employees").
216. Milwaukee Spring l, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602.
217. Id. at 611 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
218. 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981).
219. Id. at 235.
220. Id. at 236.
221. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). The Board successfully petitioned the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to remand Otis Elevator I to the
agency for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
222. Otis Elevator Il, 269 N.L.R.B. at 900.
223. Id. at 892.
224. Dennis agreed that the employer did not violate the Act but, unlike the plurality,
reached that conclusion after applying a two-part test requiring the Board's General Counsel
to prove that "a factor over which the union has control was a significant consideration in
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Zimmerman,2 25 the Dotson-Hunter opinion changed the law governing an
employer's obligation to bargain over the decision to relocate bargaining
unit work. Thus, after years of litigation, the employer initially failed but
ultimately prevailed in the litigation when management-background
individuals were appointed to the Board.
The Board's 1984 decision in Otis Elevator II was not its final
statement on the relocation-bargaining issue. In 1987 the Board held that
Dubuque Packing Company had no obligation to bargain with the Union
over the company's decision to relocate its hog kill and cut operation from
Dubuque, Iowa, to a newly purchased plant in Rochelle, Illinois.226 A
footnote in the five-paragraph opinion issued by Members Marshall Babson
and Stephens (Reagan appointees) stated that "under any of the views
expressed" in the Board's 1984 Otis Elevator H decision,227 the employer
had no obligation to bargain with the Union. 8  When the case was
remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit,229 the Board overruled Otis Elevator 11 and adopted a
new multi-prong test applicable to decision-bargaining in relocation
cases. 23  Reagan appointees, Chairman Stephens and Members Mary
Cracraft and Devaney, and George H.W. Bush appointees, Clifford Oviatt
and John Raudabaugh, all agreed that the NLRB's General Counsel bore
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that the employer's
decision to relocate bargaining unit work was not accompanied by "a basic
change in the nature of the employer's operation., 231  That showing could
be rebutted by employer evidence demonstrating that, for various reasons,
the employer's unilateral decision did not constitute an unlawful refusal to
the employer's decision," and "that the benefit for the collective-bargaining process
outweighs the burden on the business." Id. at 897 (Member Dennis, concurring).
225. Zimmerman argued that bargaining should be mandated when the "employer's
decision is related to overall enterprise costs not limited specifically to labor costs," for that
approach would recognize the possibility that "union concessions may substantially mitigate
the concerns underlying the employer's decision, thereby convincing the employer to
rescind its decision." Id. at 901 (Member Zimmerman, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
226. Dubuque Packing Co., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 499, 543 (1987), remanded, UFCW,
Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
227. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
228. Dubuque Packing Co., 287 N.L.R.B. at 499 n. 1.
229. See UFCW, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422 (1989). The court opined that
the Board's decision was "quite confusing" and asked the agency "to articulate a majority-
supported statement of the rule that the Board will be applying now and in the future in
determining whether a particular decision is subject to mandatory bargaining or not." Id. at
1436-37.
230. Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991), enforced, UFCW, Local 150-A v.
NLRB, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
231. Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. at 391.
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bargain.232 Applying this new test, the Board concluded that Dubuque
Packing had failed to establish that the "Union could not have offered labor
cost concessions that could have changed the decision to relocate., 233 This
outcome serves as a reminder that ideology does not ineluctably lead to
Board rulings favoring one side; in this case, the employer lost before a
Republican Board.
J. Board Deferral to Arbitration Awards
NLRB deferral to arbitration awards resolving unfair labor practice
and representation issues is an important federal labor law issue. As noted
by Professors Robert Gorman and Matthew Finkin, "the Board has
exercised its discretion to 'defer' to-more accurately, to show deference
to-arbitration awards already rendered when those awards effectively
dispose of the unfair labor practice or representation issue.2 34  In the
seminal 1955 decision of Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,235 the Board
deferred to an arbitration award providing that an employer was not
obligated to reinstate four employees who had engaged in misconduct
during a strike. While the Board did not decide whether it would have
ruled the same way as did the arbitration panel, the agency concluded that
deferral was appropriate: "the [arbitration] proceedings appear to have
been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision
of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act., 236 "In these circumstances," the Board wrote, "we believe that
the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes will best be served by our recognition of the arbitrators' award.
2 37
The Board's application of the Spielberg deferral standards has not
been insulated from ideology. Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.
23 8
held that, absent unusual circumstances, the Board would defer to
232. The employer can rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case by demonstrating
"that the work performed at the new location varies significantly from the work performed
at the former plant," or "that the work performed at the former plant is to be discontinued
entirely and not moved to the new location," or "that the employer's decision involves a
change in the scope and direction of the enterprise." Id. Alternatively, the employer can
defend against a charge of unlawful refusal to engage in decision-bargaining by showing
"that [direct or indirect] labor costs ... were not a factor in the decision or ... even if labor
costs were a factor in the decision, the union could not have offered labor cost concessions
that could have changed the employer's decision to relocate." Id.
233. Id. at 396.
234. GORMAN & F1NKiN, supra note 36, at 1024.
235. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
236. Id. at 1082.
237. Id. But see Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 676-77 (1972) (refusing to defer
to arbitration award); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884 (1963) (same).
238. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
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arbitration awards in discharge and discipline cases even though no
evidence bearing on the unfair labor practice issue was presented to and
considered by the arbitrator.239 Chairman Miller and Members Kennedy
and Penello, all Nixon appointees, formed the majority; Members Fanning
and Jenkins dissented. Thereafter, in Suburban Motor Freight, Inc. ,240 the
Board (Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins with the majority-creating
vote of Carter appointee Truesdale, with Member Penello dissenting)
overruled Electronic Reproduction and announced that the Board "will no
longer honor the results of an arbitration proceeding under Spielberg unless
the unfair labor practice issue before the Board was both presented to and
considered by the arbitrator. 241  Then in Professional Porter & Window
Cleaning Co.,242 Members Fanning, Jenkins, and Zimmerman adhered to
Suburban Motor Freight and declined to defer to an arbitration award,
finding that an employee had been discharged for just cause.243 In the view
of those members, "the arbitrator's gratuitous statement that [the employee]
was not discharged for protected activity does not indicate any real
consideration of the statutory issue. Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter (both appointed by President Reagan) issued separate
dissents. Hunter proposed that the Board should defer "if (1) the
contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and
(2) it appears from the record that the arbitrator was presented generally
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice.
245
The law changed when a Republican administration came into office.
Member Hunter's proposed approach was later adopted by the Board as the
governing standard in Olin Corp.246 There, the Reagan Board's Chairman
Dotson and Hunter announced:
We would find that an arbitrator has adequately considered the
unfair labor practice if (1) the contractual issue is factually
parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator
was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the
unfair labor practice .... And, with regard to the inquiry into the
"clearly repugnant" standard, we would not require an
arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board precedent.
Unless the award is "palpably wrong," i.e., unless the arbitrator's
decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the
239. Id. at 767.
240. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
241. Id. at 146-47.
242. 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
243. Id. at 137-38.
244. Id. 137.
245. Id. at 145 (Member Hunter, dissenting).
246. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
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Act, we will defer.247
K. Employer Interrogation of Known Union Advocates
The question of whether, in the absence of threats and intimidation,
the Act is violated by employer questioning of employees who are open
and known union supporters has been answered both affirmatively and
negatively by various Board members. For example, PPG Industries,
Inc. ,248 decided by Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Truesdale,
overruled prior Board decisions249 and concluded "that inquiries of this
nature constitute probing into employees' union sentiments which, even
when addressed to employees who have openly declared their union
adherence, reasonably tend to coerce employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights., 250  The Board also concluded that the questioning of
known employee union supporters "conveys an employer's displeasure
with employees' union activity and thereby discourages such activity in the
future."2 5'
PPG was later overruled by Rossmore House.25 2 Chairman Dotson
and Members Hunter and Dennis determined that "PPG improperly
established a per se rule that completely disregarded the circumstances
surrounding an alleged interrogation and ignored the reality of the
workplace.2 53 Whether an alleged interrogation violates the Act is to be
decided, not pursuant to PPG's per se approach, but by a case-by-case
examination and evaluation of all the circumstances.254 Concluding that the
247. Id. at 574 (footnotes omitted). The Board also placed on the party opposing deferral
"the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the defects in the arbitral process or award." Id.;
see also id. at 579 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting in part) (discussing what he viewed as
the flaws in the majority's analysis).
248. 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980). As noted by the Board, the evidence in that case
showed that employer foremen questioned employees about their union sympathies and
their reasons for supporting the Union. The employees were active and open supporters of
the Union and, at the time of the challenged inquiries, were wearing union insignia. Id. at
1147.
249. See Stumpf Motor Company, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 431, 444 (1974) (finding violation
of the Act by employer's act of "coercively interrogating an employee"); B. F. Goodrich
Footwear Company, 201 N.L.R.B. 353, 356 (1973) (finding an interrogation "coercive and
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the act").
250. PPG, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1147.
251. Id.
252. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984). Upon receipt of a mailgram from a Union stating that
Warren Harvey and another worker were forming a union organizing committee, the
employer's manager approached Harvey and asked, "Is this true?" Harvey answered yes;
the manager said, "Okay, thank you"; Harvey stated, "I am sorry; it is nothing personal";
and the manager responded "Okay" and returned to his office. Id. at 1176.
253. Id. at 1177.
254. See id The Board noted that it may consider the background, the type of
information sought, the questioner's identity, and "the place and method of interrogation."
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employer's questioning of the employee in the case before it was not
coercive, the Board found no violation of the Act.255 Dissenting from the
overruling of PPG, Member Zimmerman argued that the Board "ignores
the reality that employers sometimes [employ] subtle coercion during an
organizing campaign and fails to recognize that even open union adherents
may be intimidated by such coercion. ' 256 Rejecting the view that PPG had
established a per se rule, Zimmerman opined that PPG "simply recognized
that just because an employee is an open union adherent does not end the
inquiry into the lawfulness of the [employer's] interrogation of him." '257
Further, he saw "no justification for putting an employee in such a
defensive position, particularly since these conversations serve no valid
employer purpose. 258
The PPG members of the NLRB (two Democrats and a Republican,
all coming from a background of government service) 59 prohibited
employer questioning of known employee supporters of unions, finding
that such interrogations tended to coerce employees as they exercised their
organizational rights. Rossmore House, decided by management-side
Reagan appointees, replaced PPG's bright line rule with a totality-of-
circumstances standard, one which did not automatically proscribe
employer interrogations. As can be seen, different ideologies of the
members participating in the PPG and Rossmore House decisions yielded
different rules of law.
L. Weingarten Rights In Nonunion Workplaces
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. ,26 the Supreme Court, deferring to the
NLRB and endorsing the agency's "evolutional approach, 261 held that an
employer's denial of an employee's request for the presence of a union
representative during an investigatory interview2 62 conducted by an
employer violates sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act.2 63 The Court noted that
the Board's permissible but not required construction of section 7 "reached
a fair and reasoned balance upon a question within its special competence"
Id. at 1178 n.20.
255. Id. at 1178.
256. Id. (Member Zimmerman, dissenting in part).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Appendix to this Article.
260. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
261. Id. at 265.
262. An investigatory interview is one which the "employee reasonably believes may
result in the imposition of discipline." Id. at 262.
263. Id. at 268; accord ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
IDEOLOGICAL VOTING ON THE NLRB
and did not "exceed the reach of that section. ', 264  Weingarten thus
definitively answered in the affirmative the question whether employees,
upon request, have the right to their union representative in investigatory
interviews. 265 Do nonunion employees-workers who are not represented
by a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining-have that
same right? Different Boards have given different answers to that question.
Materials Research Corp.2 66 extended Weingarten rights to a nonunion
employee whose March 1979 request for a coworker's assistance at an
investigatory interview was denied by the employer.267 Members Fanning,
Jenkins, and Zimmerman, over the dissents of Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter,268 held "that the right enunciated in Weingarten applies
equally to represented and unrepresented employees." 269 In the majority's
view, this right was derived from section 7's protection of concerted
activity for workers' mutual aid or protection and was not dependent on a
union's section 9 status as the exclusive bargaining representative of
employees.270 Indeed, the Board said, nonunion workers may have even
greater need for the assistance of fellow employees as, unlike their
unionized counterparts, unrepresented workers are not subject to or covered
264. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267. The Court reasoned that the employee's request for a
union representative "clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7," id. at 260, as the
employee seeks the presence of a "knowledgeable union representative," id. at 263, and
"'aid or protection against a perceived threat to his employment security,"' id, and that the
presence of the union representative safeguards the interests of the employee and the entire
bargaining unit as it allows the Union to "exercis[e] vigilance to make certain that the
employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly," id. at
260-61; see also ILGWU v. NLRB, 420 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1975) (holding that employee
has right to union representative at investigatory interview).
265. The Court made clear that the employee must ask for her union representative and
that the employee may relinquish that right and participate in the interview without
representation. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257. In addition, the employer may lawfully
decline the employee's representation request and "is free to carry on his inquiry without
interviewing the employee, and thus leave to the employee the choice between having an
interview unaccompanied by his representative, or having no interview and forgoing any
benefits that might be derived from one." Id. at 258. Additionally, the employer has no
legal obligation to bargain with the union representative attending the investigatory
interview and "is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in hearing the
employee's own account of the matter under investigation." Id. at 260.
266. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
267. Id. at 1010-11.
268. See id. at 1019 (Chairman Van de Water, concurring and dissenting) (arguing that
employees have no right to a interview representative where there is no recognized or
certified union representative under section 9); id. at 1021 (Member Hunter, concurring and
dissenting) (stating that the Weingarten right "flows from the status of the union as
collective-bargaining representative").
269. Id. at 1016 (majority decision).
270. Id. at 1012. On the union's exclusive representative status under section 9, see
supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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by a labor agreement, and the support of other nonunion workers "may
diminish any tendency by an employer to act unjustly or arbitrarily.
27'
A few years later, in Sears, Roebuck & Co.,272 the Board considered
the legality of an employer's May 1979 refusal to grant a nonunion
employee's Weingarten request.273  Overruling Materials Research,
Chairman Dotson and Member Dennis issued an opinion stating that
employees have no Weingarten rights in the absence of a section 9
bargaining representative.274 Materials Research "told employers, in effect,
that they have the right to act on an individual basis with respect to an
employee's terms or conditions of employment except for the conduct of an
investigatory interview., 275  Declining to endorse any rule requiring a
nonunion employer to deal with employees on a collective as opposed to an
individual basis, and tying Weingarten rights to section 9, Dotson and
Dennis declared that the "[s]ection 7 rights of one group cannot be
mechanically transplanted to the other group at the expense of important
statutory policies. 276
A subsequent Board decision, E.1 du Pont de Nemours,277 reaffirmed
the agency's view that nonunion workers did not have Weingarten
representational rights. Chairman Stephens and Members Wilford
Johansen, Babson, and Cracraft determined that a "fair and reasoned
balance" between the interests of labor and management was best assured
"by not imposing the constraints on investigatory interviews that
recognition of the Weingarten right entails. 278  Conceding that a literal
reading of section 7 suggested that nonunion employees did have
representational rights, the Board thought it less likely that a nonunion
employee would provide the type of helpful assistance at an interview as
271. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1045 (1982) (finding that employer violated Act by denying
nonunion employee's request for coworker's assistance and by terminating the employee),
enforcement denied, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that employee request for
coworker did not constitute concerted activity in the absence of evidence of past activity
between workers and that there was no indication that other employees would have
responded to the interviewee's request).
272. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
273. Id. at 254-56 (Taplitz, A.L.J.).
274. Member Hunter concurred, adhering to the views expressed in his Materials
Research dissent, see supra note 268. Hunter did not believe that the Act compelled the
finding that nonunion workers have no Weingarten rights. In his view, extending such
rights to nonunion workers was "a permissible but not a reasonable construction of the Act."
Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 232 (Member Hunter, concurring).
275. Id. at 231.
276. Id.
277. 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988), review denied by Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11 (3d
Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
278. Id. at 628 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that provided by a union representative, and it further opined that extending
Weingarten rights to unrepresented workers could actually work to their
detriment since employers may legally forego the interview and employees
would not be able to challenge disciplinary actions in a subsequent dispute
resolution proceeding.279
From 1985 to 2000 the Board adhered to the position that nonunion
employees did not have Weingarten rights. Epilepsy Foundation of
Northeast Ohio280 jettisoned the no-rights-rule and resurrected Materials
Research. Chairman Truesdale and Members Fox and Liebman rejected as
speculative the employer's argument that employee witnesses "would not
be motivated to act in the interests of their fellow workers, or that
employees might lack the abilities to offer constructive assistance to the
interviewed employee., 281 They also rejected as speculative the contention
that an assertion of Weingarten rights in the nonunion setting would
disadvantage employees in the event the employer decided to forgo the
28interview. 82 This assertion "assumes the worst in employer motives [and]
ignores the fact that employees are not obligated to request the presence of
a Weingarten representative., 283 Finally, the Board determined, contrary to
the argument of dissenting Member Hurtgen, that the recognition of
nonunion Weingarten rights would not place an "unknown trip wire" in
front of employers involved in investigations of employee misconduct.
28 4
The majority could not "understand how an employer's ignorance of
employee rights provides a justification for denying those rights to
279. See id. at 630 (arguing that Weingarten rights for nonunion employees might induce
employers to cancel investigatory interviews and nonunion employers will have no other
contractually-bargained opportunity to present their case). Nonunion employees may
challenge adverse employment decisions where a company has established an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism such as arbitration or mediation. See IBM Corp., 341
N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 23 (June 9, 2004) (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting)
("In nonunion workplaces, employer-imposed alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms, from grievance procedures to compulsory arbitration, are becoming
increasingly common.").
280. 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
281. Id. at 679.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.; see id. at 684 (Member Hurtgen, dissenting in part) ("(B]y grafting the
representational rights of the unionized setting onto the nonunion workplace, employers
who are legitimately pursuing investigations of employee conduct will face an unknown
trip-wire placed there by the Board."). The Board rejected Hurtgen's argument that
nonunion employers "will generally be completely unaware of this right to representation
that the Board is imposing on them," an observation accompanied by his statement that the
"workplace has become a garden of litigation and the Board is adding another cause of





Epilepsy Foundation survived judicial review by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.28 6 Writing for the
court, Judge Harry Edwards acknowledged that "the Board has changed its
position several times in considering whether employees in nonunion
workplaces may invoke the Weingarten right.""2 7 This change of mind was
not a forbidden agency action. "It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain
substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate with the changing
compositions of the Board. '288  As "[a]n otherwise reasonable
interpretation of [section] 7 is not made legally infirm because the Board
gives renewed, rather than new, meaning to a disputed statutory
provision," 289 the court did not invalidate the Board's return to Materials
Research.29°
The Board recently changed its institutional mind yet again. In IBM
Corp., 291 Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg, with the concurrence of
Member Schaumber, announced that "national labor relations policy will
be best served by overruling existing precedent and returning to the earlier
precedent of du Pont, which holds that Weingarten rights do not apply in a
nonunion setting., 292 Agreeing with the policy considerations noted in the
Board's prior rulings denying nonunion Weingarten rights, Battista and
Meisburg introduced new elements into the decisional calculus: the "ever-
increasing requirements to conduct workplace investigations, as well as
new security concerns raised by incidents of national and workplace
violence., 293  In an age of, and in the wake of, Enron-type corporate
scandals, 294  post-9/1 1 terrorism concerns, and the mandates of
antidiscrimination laws, "the policy considerations expressed in DuPont
have taken on a new vitality. 295 Battista and Meisburg expressed their
concern that the confidentiality of employer investigations could be
285. Id. at 679 (majority decision).
286. See Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (upholding Board's decision to grant Weingarten rights to nonunion employees).
287. Id. at 1099.
288. Id. at 1097.
289. Id.
290. Id. The court did reverse the Board's retroactive application of its return to
Materials Research because the law at the time of the employer's denial of the employee's
representation request did not grant such a right and the employer had "acted with no
apparent risk in following the law." Id. at 1102.
291. 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (June 9, 2004).
292. Id., slip op. at 2.
293. Id., slip op. at 3.
294. See generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (describing and analyzing the causes and
consequences of recent large-scale corporate scandals).
295. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 4.
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compromised where a nonunion employee "inadvertently 'let slip'
confidential, sensitive, or embarrassing information" in "casual
conversation" with other employees or workplace friends.296 Thus, "on
balance, the right of an employee to a coworker's presence in the absence
of a union is outweighed by an employer's right to conduct prompt,
efficient, thorough, and confidential workplace investigations. 297
Ideological voting is on display in the dissenting opinion by Members
Liebman and Walsh. "Today," they wrote, "American workers without
unions, the overwhelming majority of employees, are stripped of a right
integral to workplace democracy. '29 Accusing the Board of treating
nonunion workers like "second-class citizens of the workplace,"2 99 and
assuming for the sake of argument that affording Weingarten rights to
unrepresented employees could make it more difficult for employers to
conduct investigations, 300 the dissenters argued that there was no post-
Epilepsy Foundation evidence that nonunion coworker representation
interfered with investigations. Nor were they persuaded by the argument
that coworker assistance was not good policy in light of threats of
terrorism, workplace violence, and corporate abuses. "[A]llowing workers
to represent each other has no conceivable connection with workplace
violence and precious little with corporate wrongdoing, which in any case
seems concentrated in the executive suite, not the employee cubicle or the
factory floor., 30 1 By overruling Epilepsy Foundation "not because they
must, and not because they should, but because they can," the Board was
"taking a step backwards," Liebman and Walsh contended, and had issued
a decision "unlikely to have an enduring place in American labor law.,
30 2
The changes in Board law in this area have followed election
296. Id., slip op. at 6.
297. Id., slip op. at 7. Member Schaumber argued in his concurrence that the "better
construction [of the NLRA] and the one most consistent with the language and policies of
the Act" would hold that the Weingarten right is unique to union-represented employees.
Id., slip op. at 8 (Member Schaumber, concurring). Where employees are not represented
by a union, employers have a common law right to deal with workers on an individual basis,
and section 7's concerted activity requirement "may not be presumed but must be
demonstrated." Id., slip op. at 13. No such demonstration is made, in his view, where an
employee requests a coworker's presence at an investigatory interview, for that request "is
neither an interaction among employees nor a conversation between two (or more)
employees." Id., slip op. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
298. Id., slip op. at 18 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting).
299. Id.
300. See id., slip op. at 22 ("[W]e will assume that nonunion employees' right to
representation makes it harder, in some measure, for employers to discharge [the] obligation
[to investigate]."). This assumption did not lead Liebman and Walsh to the conclusion "that
nonunion workers are never entitled to a coworker representative in investigatory
interviews." Id.
301. Id., slip op. at 18.
302. Id., slip op. at 23.
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returns. 30 3  In Materials Research, an employee-protective decision
extending Weingarten rights to nonunion employees, Reagan appointees
Van de Water and Hunter were outvoted by Members Fanning (a Democrat
appointed by Eisenhower), Jenkins (a Republican appointed by Kennedy),
and Zimmerman (an Independent Carter appointee). 304  Three Reagan
appointees-Dotson, Dennis, and Hunter-interred Materials Research
and (to the delight of management) limited Weingarten to unionized
workplaces. That limitation, reaffirmed by five Reagan appointees in the
1988 du Pont decision, was then rejected by Clinton appointees Truesdale,
Fox, and Liebman (the latter two members from union-side backgrounds)
in Epilepsy Foundation; the only Board member arguing for adherence to
precedent in that 2000 decision was Hurtgen, a management-side member
also appointed by Clinton. Lest there be any doubt as to the significance of
ideology, Bush management-side appointees Battista, Meisburg, and
Schaumber flip-flopped back to du Pont, with Democrats Liebman and
Walsh in the minority. In sum, the question whether a nonunion employee
has a right to Weingarten representation has been predictably answered
affirmatively by Democratic administration Boards and negatively by
Republican administration Boards.
M Employer's Claimed Inability to Pay
It is well settled that an employer's assertion that it cannot afford to
pay what a union seeks in labor negotiations may trigger a company's
obligation to provide the union, upon the union's request, with information
substantiating the claim of inability to pay.305
Recently, in American Polystyrene Corp. ,306 the Board concluded that
an employer, who, in response to a union financial proposal said, "No, I
can't. I'd go broke," made, but effectively retracted, its inability to pay
claim. 307  Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber assumed that the
employer made the statement "during the heat of bargaining," but found
303. This calls to mind the statement, "no matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag
or not, th' supreme coort [sic] follows th' iliction [sic] returns." FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR.
DOOLEY'S OPINIoNs 26 (1901).
304. See Appendix to this Article.
305. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1956) (affirming NLRB
decision finding that not providing requested financial data to union when claiming inability
to pay in contract negotiations was not good faith bargaining under the NLRA); see also
Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 697, 701 (1991) (finding that "an employer's
obligation under Truitt to provide a union with information" arises "only when the employer
has signified that it is at present unable to pay proposed wages and benefits"), review denied
by Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1992).
306. 341 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (Mar. 30, 2004).
307. Id., slip op. at 1.
750
IDEOLOGICAL VOTING ON THE NLRB
that the employer retracted the claim in a letter delivered to the Union the
day after the bargaining session in which the "I'd go broke" statement was
made.30 8 They concluded that the employer "unequivocally advised the
Union that [the company's] ability to pay for the Union's bargaining
proposals was not in question."30 9 Interestingly, the Board noted that the
employer's denial that the "I'd go broke" statement was ever made had
been rejected by the administrative law judge.310 Battista and Schaumber
reasoned that the discredited testimony did not constitute lying under oath,
for a "witness can be mistaken or, through faulty recollection, may honestly
believe her testimony.,
311
Member Walsh's dissent emphasized that the employer's actions did
not constitute a retraction of its stated inability to pay. Disagreeing with
the majority, he found it significant that the administrative law judge did
not believe the employer's assertion that the "I'd go broke" statement had
never been communicated to the union. "Because the judge discredited
[the] denial ...each of the [employer's] subsequent alleged retractions
began with a falsehood. Clearly, lying is a sign of bad-faith bargaining.
An effect of lying is to place in doubt the veracity of any subsequent
statements about the subject matter of the lie."'312 As "there was no reason
for the Union to believe anything else [the employer] had to say on the
matter," Walsh concluded that the employer did not unequivocally retract
its claim. 13
American Polystyrene is an important example of one way in which
ideology operates within a settled rule of law. Both the majority and the
dissent agreed on the applicable law but differed as to the application of the
operative legal rule to the facts of the case. Bush appointees and
Republican management-side Members Battista and Schaumber ruled in
the employer's favor.314 Member Walsh, a government-service Democrat
initially appointed by Clinton and reappointed by Bush, rejected the
employer's defense. While the flip-flops in other areas of labor law
discussed in this Part were not repeated, the Board members' positions
were consistent with this Article's ideological voting hypothesis.
308. Id., slip op. at 2. The Board had previously ruled that an employer is not required to
provide a union with requested financial information where the employer has retracted its
"unable to pay" claim. See, e.g., Central Mgmt. Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 763, 769 (1994) (finding
that an effective withdrawal of an inability to pay claim ceases the obligation of the
employer to provide requested financial information).
309. 341 N.L.R.B. No. 67, slip op. at 2.
310. Id., slip op. at 7 (Parke, A.L.J.).
311. Id., slip op. at 3 (majority decision).
312. Id., slip op. at 4 (Member Walsh, dissenting) (citation omitted).
313. Id.
314. See Appendix to this Article.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
More than just an abstract and academic phenomenon, ideological
voting by the members of the NLRB affects workers, employers, and
unions living under and operating within the regulatory regime of the Act
as construed and applied by the Board. The impact of such voting on the
agency's constituencies is all the more pronounced when a flip-flopping
and seesawing Board changes and departs from precedent as it determines
the legality or illegality of the conduct of those subject to its regulation.
What are the implications of the ideological voting discussed in the
preceding pages? Should we be concerned that, throughout the agency's
history, a number of Board decisions have been decided by votes reflective
of and consistent with the ideology of the members participating in those
cases? To the extent that "[o]ne of the basic ideas contained in the [Act] is
to substitute the rule of law for industrial strife," '315 the concern that a
particular Board decision may reflect and give operative effect to member
ideology and is not an impartial application of law to facts is problematic.
The "rule of law demands that everyone be subject to the same law"'3 16 and
"that like cases should be treated alike." '317 The phrase "rule of law" is
jurisprudential shorthand for, among other things, dispassionate and
impartial judging by those entrusted with the task and responsibility of
resolving legal disputes. The impartial judge is or should be indifferent to
both the identity of the parties before her and to the ultimate outcome of the
case. That outcome should be dictated, not by biased or inclinational
adjudication, but by reasoned, disinterested, and evenhanded application of
the pertinent legal rule. The Board generally "serves the purpose of the
rule of law" by the "working out of principles which are generally applied
to similar situations," thereby "enabling those governed by the Act to
predict, with some degree of close approximation, the course enforcement
will take." '318
It has been urged, however, that decisionmaker impartiality is
unachievable. "Pure impartiality is an ideal that can never be completely
attained. Judges, after all, are human beings who come to the bench with
feelings, knowledge, and beliefs . . . . about legal issues they must
decide."319 On that view, the rule of law's "government of laws and not of
315. William B. Gould IV, Recognition Laws: The US. Experience and Its Relevance to
the UK., 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 11, 13 (1998).
316. H.W. Arthurs, National Traditions in Labor Law Scholarship: The Canadian Case,
23 Comp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 645, 662 (2002).
317. Ingram, supra note 17, at 361.
318. Harvey Pinney, Administrative Discretion and the NLRB, 18 Soc. F. 275, 277-78
(1939).
319. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L.
REv. 605,605 (1996).
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men '320 ideal gives way to the reality of the partial and interested rule of
the decisionmaker. The difference between the rule of law and the rule of
men has been described by Peter Ingram:
Simply, there is an opposition between the idea of actions which
are an expression of the agent's will and therefore also, too often,
an expression of his partiality, irrationality or liability to error,
and the idea of actions that, although they are still a person's
actions, are guided and even determined by law as a secure
system of rules representing abiding general standards and not
immediately embodying the particular desires of individuals. Of
course, legal rules themselves are by no means permanent; and
they are created, changed and abolished by people. They can
reflect biases, embody misguided values, and express their intent
wrongly or ambiguously; and they are subject to error in
interpretation and execution. Nevertheless, as general rules, laws
strive to be independent of personal whims.321
Ideological voting on the NLRB resulting in different legal rules under
Democratic and Republican Boards can give the appearance and create the
impression that the members of this quasi-judicial administrative agency
sometimes "act[] like politicians carrying out their electoral mandate to
favor labor or to favor management. 322  The legislator and politician,
unlike the impartial adjudicator, can be as biased and partial as she likes as
she pursues and tries to enact into law her policy preferences. Not bound
by the conventions of the rule of law, the legislator is legitimately
interested in the views and desires of her constituents and, if she agrees
with those positions, may attempt to enshrine them in a legislative
command. If a Board member acts in this way and favors labor over
management or vice versa, the agency's product is not the output of
principled adjudication as measured by the rule of law theory discussed
above. If this view is correct, the Board may be more properly viewed as a
quasi-legislative, and not a quasi-judicial, institution engaged in law-as-
ideology adjudication and decisionmaking favoring a member's preferred
side of the labor-management divide.
Viewing the Board as a court-like body may unfairly and incorrectly
subject the agency to the rule-of-law critique. As noted by one
commentator:
[T]he Board-although an adjudicator and in other ways
'judicial'-must, if its existence in its present form is to be
justified, have functions not generally attributed to common-law
courts. The Board acts collegially-that is, it adjudicates or
320. Pinney, supra note 318, at 275.
321. Ingram, supra note 17, at 359 (footnote omitted).
322. Fried, supra note 2, at 179.
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engages in rule-making by majority vote of a panel or of the
entire membership-rather than as adjudicators in the fashion of
trial judges. 3
Moreover, "Board members, unlike federal judges, are not well insulated
from the swings of the political process. Since their appointment is for
only five years, they seem exceptionally subject to that process and
deliberately so. 3 2 4 As a policymaking institution with express rulemaking
power,325 the Board's "intended functions [are] broader than those
generally entrusted to courts, and ones more subject to some form of
political control. 326  Given "the existence of the collegial action
requirement, the lack of insulation from political forces, and the presence
of rule-making power.., these functions are in the area of policy-making
in a broadly legislative sense., 327 The policymaking Board
acquire[s] knowledge, not so much as an aid to the fashioning of
legal doctrine as a means of determining and evaluating the
impact of that doctrine. The Board might be viewed as an agency
that can pronounce rules, watch them in operation, and modify or
abandon them as their impact is shown to be undesirable. The
Board is thus distinguished from a court not only in its superior
ability to learn relevant facts, but also in its relative freedom from
the doctrine of stare decisis and from the need to appear to have
found the one correct rule of law every time it adjudicates.328
The proposition that the Board enjoys some degree of freedom from
the doctrine of stare decisis and is not bound by precedent3 29 was made and
defended in a recent speech by current NLRB Chairman Robert Battista.
Pointing to the NLRA's "broad language," Battista remarked:
[I]t is not surprising that Board law changes from time to time.
The Board's freedom to act within parameters means that
different Boards will act in different ways. Congress envisioned
this freedom and basically said: so long as the Board does not
stray from fundamental principles and explains itself, it has the
323. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review ofAgency Decisions: The Labor Board and
the Court, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. 53, 54.
324. Id; see also GOULD, supra note 12, at 125 (discussing political impact of Board
members' five-year terms).
325. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
326. Winter, supra note 323, at 55.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 63.
329. As Professor Fred Schauer explains, "[t]he previous treatment of occurrence X in
manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in
manner Y if and when X again occurs." Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv.
571,571 (1987).
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power to change.330
The chairman opined, further, that the majority of Board members
"serv[ing] relatively short and staggered terms" will "reflect, to some
degree, the governing philosophy of the appointing President. Purists may
gnash their teeth at this, but it was part of the congressional design.,
331
Cautioning that "[t]his is not to say that Congress intended that one party
would blindly overrule the precedents of the other party, 332 Battista
emphasized that the Board
is not an Article III court and thus the doctrine of stare decisis
does not strictly apply. However, all responsible Members
recognize the value of having stability, predictability, and
certainty in the law. But, if a Member honestly believes that a
prior precedent no longer makes sense, and that a change would
be within the fundamental principles [of the Act], he/she can vote
to change the law. To be sure, the values of stare decisis counsel
against an onslaught of changes. But prudently exercised, change
is proper and indeed was envisioned by Congress.333
The agency has prudently avoided "radical[ly] swing[ing] to the left or
right," in Battista's view, and while "[m]ost of the law is well-settled,"
"[iln a few areas, the law has gone though periods of flux, but it has
ultimately settled at an accepted point.
3 34
Judicial review of Board decisions is implicated whenever the
agency's willingness to change labor law is the result of and is fueled by
member ideology. More than sixty years ago the United States Supreme
Court noted that the NLRA "left to the Board the work of applying the
Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations
of events which might be charged as violative of its terms., 3 5 The Board is
empowered to render "decisions based upon evidential facts under the
particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate
appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their
330. Robert J. Battista, Chairman, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Remarks at the 58th NYU
Annual Conference on Labor: The NLRB at 70: Its Past and Its Future 13 (May 20, 2005),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/chairman_052005_nyuspeech.htm.
331. Id. at 14; see also id. ("[B]ecause of the limited terms of Members, and the fact that
a Board majority will generally reflect the philosophic views of the President, it is not
surprising that some Boards will be viewed as leaning liberal and pro-union and other
Boards will be viewed as leaning conservative and pro-employer.").
332. Id.
333. Id. For a Board member's account of the ways in which her philosophy and core
beliefs were relevant to her decisions, see generally Patricia Diaz Dennis, A Principled
Approach to NLRB Decisionmaking, 1 LAB. LAW. 483 (1985).
334. Battista, supra note 330, at 15.
335. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
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administration. 33 6 So long as the agency's conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole,337 the Court has made clear
that "[i]f the Board adopts a rule that is rational and consistent with the Act,
then the rule is entitled to deference from the courts. 338
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. 339 is a helpful example of the
degree of judicial deference given to Board rulings. In that case, a
unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the Board that a worker can be a
company's "employee" and, at the same time, can be paid by a union for
assisting the labor organization in organizing that company's employees.
The Court asked "whether the Board may lawfully interpret" section 2(3)
of the Act "to include company workers who are also paid union
organizers. 34 ° Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the Court, explained that
"[w]e put the question in terms of the Board's lawful authority because this
Court's decisions recognize that the Board often possesses a degree of legal
leeway when it interprets its governing statute, particularly where Congress
likely intended an understanding of labor relations to guide the Act's
application. 341 Noting several arguments and factors favoring the Board's
decision and deferring to the agency's view,342 the Court stated: "We hold
336. Id. at 800 (citing NLRB v. Virginia Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1941); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (identifying "the Labor Board as one of those agencies
presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of
knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which
courts do not possess and therefore must respect").
337. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2000) ("The findings of the Board with respect to questions
of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be
conclusive."); Universal Camera Corp. 340 U.S. at 491 ("Whether on the record as a whole
there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has
placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what
ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or
grossly misapplied.").
338. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987) (citation
omitted); see also Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998)
("Courts must defer to the requirements imposed by the Board if they are rational and
consistent with the Act, and if the Board's explication is not inadequate, irrational or
arbitrary." (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v.
NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (stating that courts should grant "the greatest deference"
to the Board); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990) (noting
that the Board has the "primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor
policy").
339. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
340. Id. at 89.
341. Id. at 89-90.
342. Rejecting the employer's argument that the Board's decision was inconsistent with
common-law agency principles, the Court concluded that the Board's decision was
"consistent with the broad language of the Act itself," id. at 90, was "consistent with several
of the Act's purposes" and with the Congressional reports and legislator statements on the
floor of the United States House of Representatives, id. at 91, was consistent with the
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only that the Board's construction of the word 'employee' is lawful; that
term does not exclude paid union organizers. 343
Town & Country also cited Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,344 the Court's important decision setting forth the
scope of judicial review of federal administrative agencies' interpretations
of law.345 Recognizing that Congress may expressly or implicitly delegate
to agencies the authority to fill gaps in statutory provisions, 346 Chevron
instructs courts to ask two questions when "review[ing] an agency
construction of the statute which it administers., 347 First, the court must
ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. 348 Where Congressional intent is clear, "the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. ' '349 Second, and where "the court determines [that] Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue," the court must ask
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute., 350 Thus, a court facing statutory silence or ambiguity may "not
simply impose its own construction on the statute" 35' and must defer to
permissible agency readings, even when that reading is not "the only one
[the agency] permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or
even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had
arisen in a judicial proceeding. 352
Given this Article's subject and purpose, another aspect of Chevron is
Court's section 2(3) precedent, and was supported by 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1), a provision in
the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act prohibiting employer payments to persons
employed by unions except where a union employee is also an employee of the employer,
id. at 92.
343. Id. at 98.
344. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
345. Chevron has been cited by the Court in its opinions reviewing NLRB decisions.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001); Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398 (1996); see also Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (195 1) (holding "that the standard of proof specifically required
of the Labor Board . . . is the same as that to be exacted by courts reviewing every
administrative action subject to the Administrative Procedure Act").
346. The Court opined that where "Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision
of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843-44. Where the legislative delegation to the agency is implicit, "a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 844.
347. Id. at 842.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 842-43.
350. Id. at 843.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 843 n.ll.
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of particular interest and relevance. Comparing the judiciary and
administrative agencies, the Court stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's view of wise policy to inform its
judgments....
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers of the wisdom of
an agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In
such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of
the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches." '353
Chevron thus recognizes that an administrative agency's formulation
of law and policy may fluctuate along with and may reflect changes in
presidential administrations. It must be acknowledged, however, that this
oscillation354 caused by ideology-based changes in operative legal rules has
practical and real-world consequences. Consider, in this regard, the
Board's flip-flops in the area of election campaign misrepresentations,355 a
phenomenon cited by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit as an example of the agency's "fickleness" '356 and "indecision. 357
And recall the Board's changing positions on the legality of employer
353. Id. at 865-66 (emphasis added) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
354. See generally Estreicher, supra note 28 (discussing policy oscillations in the
Board's decisions).
355. See supra Part III.A.
356. Mosey Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1983).
357. Id. at 615. In Mosey, the employer, arguing that the Union misrepresented a wage
increase matter, refused to bargain following the Union's win in an NLRB election
proceeding. Id at 612. The court noted the Board's changing views on the regulation of
campaign misrepresentations and the fact that the Board's rule of law governing the
employer's conduct had changed from Shopping Kart to General Knit to Midland National,
see supra Part III.A, all within a five-year period as the employer litigated the case before
the Board and the court. Mosey, 701 F.2d at 612. Judge Posner, writing for the en banc
court, stated that in "changing its mind ... the Board has put [the employer] through the
hoops, subjecting it to protracted legal expense and uncertainty." ld. Given "the long
delay" in reaching a final disposition of the case "due to the Board's indecision," the court
denied enforcement of the Board's order requiring the employer to bargain with the Union.
Id. at 615.
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denials of a nonunion employee's request for the presence of a coworker
during an investigatory interview. In 1980 the Board held that the March
1979 request of an employee was protected activity; in 1984 the Board
concluded that an employer had lawfully denied another worker's May
1979 representational request."' Thus, the issue of the legality of employer
denials of two employees' efforts to procure the assistance of their fellow
workers, requests separated in time by two months, was treated and decided
differently. Experiencing the same pendulum swing, the Otis Elevator
Company was told by the Board in 1981 that its decision to move certain
work from New Jersey to Connecticut without bargaining with its workers'
union was illegal. After a change in the Board's membership, that exact
same conduct by the employer was deemed lawful.359
As can be seen, one consequence of the Board's ideological voting is
the reality that certain areas of labor law are subject to change based on the
outcomes of presidential elections and the resulting appointments of NLRB
members. With regard to some (but not all) issues, Republican
administration Boards have ruled in favor of business and Democratic
administration Boards have ruled in favor of labor.360 This reality should
not be surprising given the "extraordinary vagueness of the NLRA' 361 and
the strongly held and disparate views of Board appointees concerning the
role and scope of federal intervention in and the regulation of labor-
management relations and collective bargaining.
Because, as Chairman Battista noted, Board members may not
consider themselves bound by the decisions issued by their predecessors,
3 62
and given the agency's presumed expertise and the assumption that the
Board's competence is superior to that of generalist judges,36 3 NLRB flip-
flops and seesaws, while problematic, may be unavoidable. When
precedent is overruled as the result of ideological voting, those subject to
the Board's jurisdiction may question the fairness of the adjudicatory
process and result, may experience difficulty in conforming their conduct
to unsettled and destabilized legal rules and doctrines, and may find it
difficult to view as credible an agency in which ideology and partiality can
be demonstrably outcome-influential if not outcome-determinative.
364
Changes in the law attributable solely or primarily to changes in the
358. See supra Part III.K.
359. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
360. See Moe, supra note 13, at 1102 ("A change in presidential administration from
Republican to Democrat gives rise to a pro-labor shift in NLRB performance ... ").
361. Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and
the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REv. 387, 393 (1995).
362. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
364. See Schauer, supra note 329, at 595-98, 600-02 (discussing the justifications for
and the benefits of adherence to precedent).
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ideologies of Board members therefore warrant asking the question
whether the changes correspond to the political affiliations of the President
and Board members as opposed to "institutional developments or to new
insights produced by a maturing expertise. 3 65  As noted by one
commentator, "[i]f precedent is repeatedly disregarded, one must question
whether the result is based more on political/personal viewpoints rather
than a measured view of the law. 366 If ideology is the explanation for the
disregard of precedent, the suspicion that bias and partiality are affecting, if
not driving, decisional outcomes grows even stronger.
NLRB flip-flops resulting from ideological voting can also have
adverse implications with regard to the agency's presumed expertise and
judicial review and evaluation of Board decisions. While administrative
law anticipates administration-based policy changes, 367 the vote-predictive
Board member ideology observed in the "willingness" of pro-union or pro-
employer Boards "to challenge and change well established precedent"
3 68
raises
the issue of whether the interpretation [of the Act] being given is
a reasoned one or whether the Agency is acting in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. The mantle of expertise can only be
extended so far if there is a constant change in course, and the
reputation of the Agency is also diminished. 
69
365. Bernard D. Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30
U. CHI. L. REv. 78, 78 (1962).
366. Andrew M. Kramer, The Clinton Labor Board: Difficult Times for a Management
Representative, 16 LAB. LAW. 75, 99 (2000).
367. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
368. Kramer, supra note 366, at 80.
369. Id. at 81. The NLRB's expertise has been the subject of dispute. Consider one
analyst's view:
The National Labor Relations Board is an especially easy target for skeptics
of agency expertise, consistency and neutrality. From its inception, the
controversial nature of the NLRB's business has subjected it to attack, and not
without reason. With respect to expertise, it has been observed that courts
routinely incant that the board is expert in industrial relations, so that it can
evaluate the effects of suspect management actions on workers; yet the board
does no empirical work, nor does its staff include experts in social science,
industrial relations, or business administration who might ably address such
questions.
In a sense, the NLRB myth is functional because it allows the court to
narrow its scope of review rather than independently address the complex
factual and policy matters about which it knows even less than the board. So,
sometimes courts acknowledge doubts about the reality of board expertise but
then defer anyway. But the veil of fictional expertise also obscures the
continuing costs of possibly unsound decisions. Rigorous judicial scrutiny
might prod the agency to develop genuine and useful expertise, if only to resist
encroachment.
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To the extent that a Board ruling is or appears to be the product of
management-inclined members favoring management or union-inclined
members favoring unions or employees, the presumption of Board
expertise becomes questionable and the deferential judicial review
appropriately applied in most cases is not rigorous enough. In that
circumstance, reviewing courts should take a hard look at the basis or bases
for the agency's ruling, with particular scrutiny of the sufficiency of the
record evidence and the decision's legal analysis and reasoning and
rationality. A court must ask, skeptically and not deferentially, whether the
Board acted within or outside of the limits of Congress's delegation.37°
Hard look review will not necessarily lead to judicial invalidation of or
refusal to enforce Board decisions, as courts may still be reluctant to undo
or enter into the realm of agency policymaking. But the possibility of such
review may serve as a catalyst for the Board to carefully consider the
institution's ideological departures from and returns to various rules and
policies.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to demonstrate that NLRB members have
cast ideological votes in a number of cases addressing and deciding various
issues of labor law and policy. Vote-predictive Board member ideology, as
defined herein, 371' has had an outcome-influential and outcome-
determinative impact in a number of areas of federal labor law, as
evidenced by the agency's flip-flops and seesaws and willingness to reject
and overrule precedent. Thus, contrary to those who suggest or believe that
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 51-52 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see also GOULD, supra note 12, at xxi
("Board members and the general counsel tend to be Washington insiders .... Practical, or
'hands on,' experience with industrial relations or the employment relationship in the field is
unusual-as is previously acquired expertise in labor law.").
370. This point draws on Professor Jim Rossi's discussion of the hard look doctrine and
judicial review in the context of regulation in the electric utility industry. See Rossi, supra
note 45. The hard look doctrine "is characterized by the requirement of reasoned analysis,
or rationality." Id. at 820. Rossi explains:
The thrust of a requirement of rationality is this: changes in regulatory law are
permitted, but only as a product of reasoned analysis brought to bear on
accumulated experience; not just the result of transitory political forces or
regulatory appointees. To the extent that the hard look doctrine guards against
the exercise of such naked preferences in the political process by requiring
consideration of all of the relevant reasons . . . it has a legitimacy-enhancing
role and is a fully justified use of judicial authority.
Id. (footnote omitted).
371. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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the Board acts free from ideological bias,372 as a descriptive matter
ideology has mattered in a number of cases presenting controversial and
sharply contested issues of law and policy, cases in which Board majorities
have cast votes consistent with and reflecting the differing philosophies of
Republican or Democratic administrations and the pre-Board backgrounds
of members.373 When the agency's constructions and applications of the
Act fluctuate with presidential elections and resulting changes in the
Board's membership,374 it is understandable that the Board's credibility and
impartiality may be questioned, and that some suspect that the Board's
actions do not always conform to rule of law precepts. Whether the Board
should act in accordance with these principles is an issue warranting further
reflection. Considering and answering that question is all the more
important given the reality of ideological voting on the NLRB, and the
implications and real-world consequences of such voting on those who
come to the Board for its quasi-judicial determination that certain conduct
does or does not violate the NLRA.
372. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
373. See GROSS, supra note 1, at 97 ("It was not the Board's place to legislate labor law
or to formulate labor policy: that was for Congress and the president.").
374. See Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably
fluctuate with the changing compositions of the Board.").
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375. See GROSS, supra note 1, at 23, 92, 245, 247, 249; Flynn, supra note 5, at 1405 tbl.
1, 1408 tbl. 2; National Labor Relations Board Members, www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/structure
/fbmembers.asp; see also J. Robert Brame Professional Profile, www.mcguirewoods.com/la
wyers/index/JRobertBrame.asp; Nominations and Appointments, Mar. 11, 1985,
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/31185c.htm; Nomination of Clifford R.
Oviatt, Jr., To Be a Member of the National Labor Relations Board, July 19, 1989,
http:/ibushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89071909.html; Nomination of John N.
Raudabaugh To Be a Member of the National Labor Relations Board, June 20, 1990,
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90062006.html; President Names Three to
NLRB, Oct. 28, 1997, http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/legacy/102897-president-
names-three-to-nlrb.htm.
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Board Member
Raudabaugh (1990-
93)
Gould (1994-98)
Cohen (1994-96)
Fox (1996-2000)
Brame (1997-2000)
Hurtgen (1997-2002)
Liebman (1997-2002,
2002-)
Walsh (2000-01,
2002-04)
Battista (2002-)
Schaumber (2002-)
Meisburg (2004)
Appointing
President (Party)
Bush (R)
Clinton (D)
Clinton (D)
Clinton (D)
Clinton (D)
Clinton (D)
Clinton (D)
Bush (R)
Clinton (D)
Bush (R)
Bush (R)
Bush (R)
Bush (R)
Member's Member's
Party
Rep.
Dem.
Rep.
Dem.
Rep.
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Background
Management
Academia
Management
Union
Management
Management
Union
Union
Government
Government
Management
Gov./Man.
Management
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